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Abstract
Identity proofs play an important role in our lives. They are performed both in face-
to-face situations and remotely via computer networks. With the recent switch to new
electronic identity documents such as biometric passports and chip-based identity cards,
an increasing proportion of identity proofs takes place in the electronic realm. However,
the security of new electronic documents is primarily focused on counterfeit protection,
whereas privacy issues have been addressed only marginally. At the same time, when
documents are read by electronic means, a lot of information is not only revealed but also
can be copied, stored and processed without our consent.
In this thesis, we present a technology for performing identity proofs using one’s own
hand-held device. The technology is based on the design for privacy principle, enabling
the user to provide flexible identity proofs that reveal only the minimally required set
of personal information. This controlled identity revelation technique turns the hand-
held device into the user’s personal identity assistant that can replace electronic identity
documents in many circumstances. In addition, we show how privacy-aware biometric
authentication can be performed as part of an identity proof.
The system relies on the currently available handset technology. The user’s identity
information is securely stored on the standard subscriber identity module (SIM) of a GSM
mobile phone. The information is accessed through a program called identity proxy and
communicated to identity verifiers only if the user’s consent for this is acquired.
We show how to perform strong two-factor mobile user authentication remotely using
credentials stored on the SIM, without using the mobile network operator’s authentication
services. Furthermore, we demonstrate how such authentication can be used in a secure
mobile payment system based on a government-supported public key infrastructure (PKI).
Other scenarios include using the hand-held device as a secure authentication token for
producing one-time passwords, challenge responses, or digital signatures.
In conclusion, the studies presented in this thesis demonstrate how one’s own hand-
held device can be used as a reliable and trustworthy electronic identity document and
payment tool.
Universal Decimal Classification: 004.056, 004.056.523, 621.395.721.5, 654.034, 658.88
AMS (MOS) Classification: 94A60, 94A62
INSPEC Thesaurus: security; security of data; mobile communication; telecommuni-
cation security; mobile handsets; mobile computing; electronic commerce; electronic
money; public key cryptography; message authentication; data privacy; biometrics (access
control)
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1
Introduction
The number of mobile subscriptions enjoys steady growth worldwide [49]. The
main mobile applications are voice and text messaging, but other services are
also being constantly deployed. Due to the variety of services available in mobile
networks, users have started to perceive the nature of their mobile devices as
increasingly personalised [104]. Conversely, the personal nature of the hand-
held device has been used for customer identification and authentication in new
services.
Customer authentication is an important requirement in many mobile ser-
vices, as it is used for enabling transactions, and in particular providing their
authorisation and non-repudiation. In some applications, such as downloading
ringtones or music, or getting weather forecasts, authentication does not need
to be strong, and it can be based on the mobile network subscriber identity. In
other applications, such as payments, banking, or governmental services, authen-
tication by the mobile network operator is not considered adequate [54, 110].
It is difficult to strongly authenticate mobile users remotely and provide an
adequate level of non-repudiation of transactions. Current solutions addressing
this need are based on infrastructures maintained by mobile network operators
(MNOs) or banks. A public-key infrastructure can be used for authentication: the
customer’s subscriber identity module (SIM) card contains a private key, and the
related public key is stored in a database maintained by the MNO. A challenge-
response protocol is then used to authenticate the customer. By entering her
personal identification number (PIN) code, the customer permits the SIM card to
sign a challenge sent by the MNO. Such authentication is considered to be secure
enough for most business applications.
However, if customer authentication services lie in the full control of MNOs
or financial institutions, it may be hard or expensive for third parties to use
the services. As the authentication service providers are mostly interested in
increasing their revenue, they charge both the customers and the third parties
15
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for using the system. Consequently, non-profit organisations, for instance, may
face problems in developing mobile services for their members. Furthermore, it
is questionable whether such authentication may be accepted for e-government
applications, such as civil or municipal services.
The national electronic identity systems of a few countries are now available
for use in connection with services provided by mobile phones. Secure storage of
the user’s credentials on the SIM combined with the flexibility of the user interface
and the variety of communication technologies turn the hand-held device into
a powerful mobile identity tool. At the same time, both technologically and
psychologically it is different from current identification cards and passports. The
possibilities for the use of such mobile identity tool have not yet been studied
well.
In addition to the use in on-line services, hand-held devices can facilitate
proximity transactions [88], and such use has been predicted to grow with the
introduction of Near Field Communication (NFC) in mobile phones [87, 90].
Credentials such as pseudonyms, passwords, and keys for different services can
be stored on the hand-held device. This opens new ways for using the hand-held
device for user identification or authentication in proximity scenarios, and at the
same time brings up the topic of mobile identity management.
Can the mobile phone become a ubiquitous personal assistant that facilitates
identity proofs and secure mobile payments, at the same time preserving its user’s
privacy? What are the requirements for device hardware, software technology,
security enablers, and protocols that should be used for such scenarios? What
infrastructure is needed?
In this study issues of mobile user identification and authentication are
examined, and architectures for mobile identity management and secure mobile
payments are presented. In addition, the study provides insights into currently
deployed person identification practises with electronic identification documents,
and examines ways for performing privacy-aware biometric authentication of
persons. Proof-of-concept implementations of the proposed solutions are also
described, showing their reliance on currently available handset technology.
16
2
Literature review
With more than 111% mobile subscribers penetration [26], the mobile phone
is one of the most common personal devices in the European Union. Given the
popularity of mobile communication, the search for new “killer applications” has
been active among researchers. In order to set up the context for the contribution
of the thesis, in this chapter two aspects of such research are reviewed, namely
mobile identity management and mobile payments.
2.1 Mobile identity
Due to the personal nature of a hand-held device, it is seen as a suitable medium
for storing personal information and credentials for access to various services.
Indeed, almost all mobile phone users store their personal phone books in the
memory of their devices. In addition, the devices are often used for storing
personal notes, calendar items, photos, and even credit card information. As a
result, the mobile device becomes the owner’s identity-on-the-move, which we
refer to as a mobile identity.
2.1.1 Terminology
The mobile identity is composed of various components which we define in this
section. However, before moving on to identity-related notions, we first define
the basic security concepts that will be used throughout the text.
Authentication is the process by which a party (e.g., a computer or a person)
proves that it is who it claims to be. In what follows, we concentrate on the
authentication of persons only. There are three basic ways to authenticate some-
one: by something the person knows (for example, a password, secret key or a
PIN code), by something the person has (for example, a physical key, passport,
17
Chapter 2. Literature review
or a SIM card), and by something the person is (biometrics such as a fingerprint,
signature or a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) test). Identification and authorisation
are concepts that are close to authentication, yet differ from it substantially.
Identification is essentially a process through which one answers the question
“Who are you?”, telling their name or other attributes. Identification is often
followed by authentication, whereby the person provides a proof of their identity
statement. Authorisation is a process by which a person’s rights to access or use
some resource or service are determined.
There are many definitions for the concept of privacy, which differ in philo-
sophical, political, and technological discussions. In 1890 Brandeis defined
privacy as “the right to be left alone” [113], and in 1967 Westin projected this
definition on the concept of information privacy as “the claim of individuals,
groups or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent
information about them is communicated to others” [114]. In the text, we use
this definition, concentrating mostly on the privacy of individual information.
Security is a concept that is normally defined in terms of requirements specific
to a given system. Security requirements for mobile identity management are
presented in section 2.1.2.
For defining identity-related concepts, we use the Pfitzmann-Hansen termi-
nology [95], extended with a few other terms regarding a person’s identity. Here
we recall the most important notions.
Normally (especially in officially recognised practises), persons are authen-
ticated using their biometric patterns. Examples of biometrics are photos, fin-
gerprints, iris scan, or DNA. The least intrusive biometrics in modern society
are voice and photos. A digital representation of a biometric pattern is called a
biometric identifier. For example, a cryptographic hash of a biometric pattern can
serve as such an identifier. For security reasons, it is important that the biometric
patterns (and consequently identifiers) of different persons are always different.
In addition, the process of turning biometric patterns into biometric identifiers
must preserve this feature of uniqueness. In the case of cryptographic hashes, the
pre-image resistance (both first and second) of the hash function is important.
In addition to the real name1, one can use different pseudonyms in different
circumstances. A pseudonym is an identifier of a person other than one of the
person’s real names. Biometric identifiers can work as pseudonyms in some cases.
Other examples include one’s customer numbers with different service providers.
An attribute is a quality or characteristic of a person. Attributes are the
building blocks of a person’s identity. Examples of attributes are surname, blood
group, or employer’s name. Biometric patterns can also be regarded as attributes.
Attributes have names (or codes) and values.
An identity is a subset of a person’s attributes that sufficiently identifies this
person within any set of people. Often it characterises only a particular aspect
of the person, i.e., a role, position or status of the person in a given social,
business or official context. In this case only authentication of the person’s role,
position or status is needed, and authentication of the person is not required.
Identities can be either complete or partial. A complete identity is the union of
1Real names, or their representation, can be difficult to define. The author has been using four
different ways of writing his surname, three of which (but not the one written on the cover page of
this book) were officially recognised in different countries.
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all the person’s attributes, whereas a partial identity is a subset of the attributes
of the complete identity. Individuals use different partial identities in different
situations. Henceforth, “identity” refers to a partial identity unless otherwise
indicated.
An identity issuer or identity vendor is an organisation or company determining
and attesting the attributes of an identity. Identity issuers can only issue partial
identities (we assume that there are no complete identity issuers). Identity
vendors can issue certificates attesting the connection between given attributes,
biometric patterns and documents. The certificates can be either digital or issued
on paper or plastic. Using these certificates, persons can prove the integrity and
authenticity of information about them.
We denote an identity profile as a partial identity along with certificates of its
integrity and authenticity, and other partial identity related information, such as
keys or attribute certificates.
A party to which a person reveals values of certain attributes from a partial
identity or a number of partial identities, and proves their authenticity and
integrity, is called an identity verifier. In identification or authorisation scenarios,
the person presents an identity profile to the verifier.
Ideally, only the minimal set of attributes and pseudonyms required by an
identity verifier to identify a person or to correctly establish the person’s role,
position or status should be used. We refer to such minimal sets as to minimal
identities, and denote the requirement for using only minimal identities as
data minimisation. In addition, finding connections (links) between different
transactions should be made difficult for identity verifiers and third parties,
even if they collude and share all information about their transactions. This
requirement prevents the tracking of one’s actions, and is called unlinkability.
Personal information is defined as any part of an identity profile that does not
feature unlinkability. Examples of personal information are values of attributes,
certificates, pseudonyms or biometric identifiers.
Identity management is a set of procedures used for managing a person’s
various partial identities. It includes the administration of identity attributes
including the development and selection of partial identities and the pseudonyms
to be used in specific contexts or roles. Naturally, there are three parties in identity
management: a person, an identity issuer, and an identity verifier.
A storage device for one or more partial identities used by a person to reveal
and prove her identity is called an identity token. Examples of identity tokens are
ordinary identity and loyalty cards, electronic keys, or tickets. Further, we denote
an interactive device for storing and managing one or more partial identities
used by a person to reveal and prove her identity as an identity tool. The identity
tool manages identities in a digital form. Interactivity means that the selection
of a partial identity in a particular situation is possible through a user interface
with input and output capabilities. A privacy-enhancing identity tool is an identity
tool that can be used in identity management with data minimisation. A privacy-
enhancing identity tool (a) informs the person about the set of information
requested by the identity verifier, and (b) allows the person to comply with the
request or reject (or modify) it.
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2.1.2 Security and privacy requirements
In the previous section, we mentioned two privacy requirements that should be
implemented by identity management schemes, namely data minimisation and
the unlinkability of transactions performed by users. Here we extend them with
additional requirements concerning security and usability.
The parties participating in an identification or transaction authorisation
scenario are an identity prover (Peggy) and an identity verifier (Victor). Victor
needs certain proof of Peggy’s identity or her rights. There is also a Trusted
Third Party (TTP, Trent), which is an authority that has issued Peggy her partial
identity. The following properties should hold true:
Data minimisation Victor requests and receives only the necessary information
about Peggy’s identity or her rights.
User consent Peggy is informed about the set of information requested by Victor.
She can either accept of reject the request. Victor receives no information
about Peggy if she chooses to reject the request.
Unlinkability If Peggy performs two or more different authorisation transactions
with Victor, he should not be able to sufficiently distinguish whether they
are related to the same person or not. The property should hold true also
in the case of two (or more) different identity verifiers.
Authenticity and integrity Peggy cannot forge or modify the information about
herself stored by Trent in her identity tool. Victor can verify that the
information presented by Peggy is authentic. Nobody can impersonate
Peggy, even if they have physical access to Peggy’s identity tool.
Confidentiality (a) Nobody can read any information from Peggy’s identity tool,
unless she specifically allows this. The property holds true also in the case
when the device is lost or stolen. (b) Nobody can learn any information
about Peggy’s identity by eavesdropping on the communication between
Peggy and Victor.
Easiness of revocation If Peggy’s identity tool is stolen or lost, Peggy can easily
place it on a black list of revoked identities, for example by contacting
Trent.
One can see that most of the security requirements for mobile identity are
the same as for ordinary identification documents. However, the privacy require-
ments are set higher. With ordinary identification documents, the person can
choose to whom she shows them; however, it is difficult to restrict data collec-
tion from them, as the identity verifier can read all attribute values. Revoking
ordinary identification documents is also cumbersome: in most cases, a criminal
can use a stolen passport or driving license until its expiry date.
The reason for the introduction of more stringent privacy requirements is
the increase in the number of identity theft incidents [46]. Identity theft is a
crime in which an impostor obtains key pieces of personal information such as
social security numbers and driver’s license numbers and uses them for their
20
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own personal gain2. With the introduction of electronic identity documents
which are read by electronic means it has become easier to copy, store and
process personal information. Although protection against excessive collection
of personal information is provided by privacy-related laws in many countries,
such laws normally place limits only on the procedures for collecting and storing
this information, and do not restrict normal identity checks. At the same time,
with eIDs, the difference between an identity check and the collection of personal
information has become vague. This underlines the importance of informed
user consent for providing personal information in normal identity verification
scenarios.
An important requirement in any identity management scheme is its usability.
Good usability has a clear impact on the security of the system and on its
acceptance by the users. At its best, an identity management scheme should be
based on devices and interfaces whose operation is already known to most users.
The speed of operation also plays a crucial role in improving usability.
2.1.3 Electronic identity types
A person’s identity is composed of a number of identity profiles, which are used in
different social and business scenarios [25]. Even within the same organisation
a person can have several different identity profiles, or roles. For example, in a
hospital a doctor can use the role “employee” for opening the front door, and
the role “neurophysiologist in charge” for signing an electroencephalography
analysis. In computer networks, roles have been successfully used for many years
for access control (role-based access control). In everyday life, the diversity of
identity profiles can be seen in the numerous cards and certificates that the
average person has. Examples of such tokens are given in Table 1.
The governments of many countries all over the world have introduced vari-
ous types of chip-based identification documents for their citizens (see examples
in Fig. 1). The main objectives for the switch to eIDs are better resistance to
forgery, and their use in new electronic governmental services [21]. Another big
group of eIDs consists of the various types of identity cards and tokens used in
the corporate world, both for employees and the customers of companies. These
IDs are not generally recognised officially, with some notable exceptions, such
as the possibility of using bank-issued credentials for accessing some national
services in Finland and Sweden. Next, we provide a short overview of currently
used official eIDs.
Biometric passports
New biometric passports based on radio frequency identification (RFID) (also
called e-passports or Machine Readable Travel Documents, MRTDs) are now
issued by many countries. All the data on the information page of the passport is
also stored in a chip embedded into the page. In addition to the main biometric,
namely the electronic face photograph of the passport’s owner, other biometric
information is also projected to be stored in the chip in future generations
2http://www.idtheftcenter.org
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Table 1: Possible identity profiles of a person
Document/card type Examples Issuer
Citizen ID Passport, identity card Government
License Driving license, pilot
license, firearm license
Government or a certifying
authority
Insurance card or
certificate
Social insurance card,
travel insurance
certificate
Government or an insurance
company
Visa or residence permit Consulate, police, or other
authority of a foreign country
Loyalty card Customer ID card, library
card, customer group
card, mileage card
Store(chain), library, airline
Blood donor card Red Cross or another
organisation
Organisation member
card
Student card, employee
card
Organisation or company
Payment card Bank card, credit card,
preloaded value card
Financial institution
Ticket Ski lift ticket, public
transport ticket
Transport or other company
Electronic key Employer or security
company
Business card Employer or person
him/herself
of the passport. Fingerprints or iris codes are the most likely choices. Besides
better resistance to forgery, another security goal for the new passports was the
prevention of “look-alike” frauds, i.e. the cases when a passport is used by a
person who resembles the rightful owner of the passport [56]. Such fraud can be
prevented only if verification against the biometric pattern is done automatically;
so far, it is mostly performed by humans.
The biometric passport security features are based on the international
standards issued by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) [59].
The standards cover the integrity, confidentiality and authenticity of the passport
data and the contents of messages sent between the passport and a passport
reader. In the current generation of the passports this is achieved by a mechanism
called Basic Access Control (BAC). In order to communicate with the passport
chip, the reader must first optically read the machine readable zone printed
at the bottom of the main data page. From this data, the reader constructs
the access key, which is then used for encrypting the commands sent to the
chip and decrypting the answers received from it. This mechanism prevents
the remote skimming of passport data without its owner’s consent: in order to
access the chip, the reader must possess the physical document. However, it
has been shown in several studies [56, 66, 115] that part of the contents of the
machine readable zone can be easily guessed, making it possible to guess the
access key in a relatively short amount of time. ISO 14443 tokens, used as chips
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Figure 1: Officially recognised electronic IDs in Finland: biometric passport,
identity card, PKI-SIM card.
in biometric passports, can be activated from a distance of up to 29 cm, and
read from a distance of 15 cm [51]. Although the numbers do not look that
impressive, remote skimming of passports in a crowded area is feasible.
Extended Access Control (EAC) [45], a standard developed by the European
Union, can solve the problem of remote skimming, as it requires that the reader
must first authenticate itself to the chip. A challenge-response mechanism is used
for reader authentication: the reader proves that it possesses the private key for
a certificate trusted by the chip. It must be noted, however, that key management
is not easy in this scheme. For example, as the chip does not have a reliable
source of time, it cannot reliably check whether the certificate presented by the
reader is valid. This makes it possible for malicious terminals to use old expired
certificates for compromised keys in some cases. In addition, the use of EAC is
only mandatory to access the most sensitive information, such as fingerprints
or iris codes. For access to face photographs, on the other hand, its use is only
recommended. Nonetheless, EAC is still a good improvement over BAC. The main
problem, however, is that currently most passports use BAC, not EAC.
Even if EAC is used, an adversary can mount a relay attack to impersonate the
rightful passport owner [50, 55]. In a relay attack the adversary works as a man-
in-the-middle (MITM) between a valid passport and a valid reader. The attacker
presents a maliciously crafted device to the reader. The device is connected over
a high-speed wireless communication technology to another reader that accesses
the victim’s passport. The attack is difficult to prevent because all replayed
messages follow the standard protocol and their contents are not changed. A
possible countermeasure is a distance-bounding protocol [52], which is based
on the fact that relaying introduces detectable delays in the communication.
Distance bounding, however, is not used in currently deployed passports.
Other countermeasures aimed at improving the security and privacy of bio-
metric passports include using zero-knowledge proofs for authenticating the
chip of the passport [81] and using optical memory instead of (or in addition
to) the machine-readable zone as a source of the key data [72]. Neither of
these countermeasures have been implemented so far. A good overall conclusion,
supported by many studies, is given in the Budapest Declaration on Machine
Readable Travel Documents [44], where the FIDIS project states that new bio-
metric passports “dramatically decrease security and privacy and increase the
risk of identity theft.”
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Electronic identity cards
Most European countries have introduced electronic identity cards, driven by
the demands set by common European legislation, namely the Digital Signature
Directive [105]. Electronic identity cards are already in use also in some Asian
countries3. In the USA, a federal chip-based ID card (Real ID) is currently under
development. However, many privacy-protecting organizations4 are objecting to
it.
As an example of an identity card, we briefly describe here the Finnish
electronic identity (FINEID) card. The card (see Fig. 1) along with the supporting
infrastructure [97] is a system maintained by the Finnish Population Register
Centre (PRC). The card is a usual microprocessor smart card which is accepted as
a travel document in all European Union countries and several others. It contains
two Citizen Certificates (public key certificates): the authentication certificate
of the card holder and the signature certificate of the card holder. The private
keys of both certificates are generated by the card and stored exclusively in
its protected memory. Additionally, the card contains the PRC’s own certificate
authority (CA) certificate. The card can perform operations involving a private
key (e.g., calculate a digital signature) after the user has entered the PIN code
corresponding to the key. No biometric information is stored in the chip.
The PRC maintains an online certificate directory (FINEID directory). Each
registered individual gets a unique Finnish electronic user identity (FINUID)
number. The public keys of each user can be downloaded via a search with
the appropriate criteria. In addition, a revocation list of invalid certificates is
available from the FINEID directory. The validity of a certificate can be checked
against the revocation list, or using the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
[83].
The facilities of the FINEID card are mainly used for user authentication in
online services. For example, one can request a tax card or check one’s pension
accrual on the Internet, by inserting the card into a card reader and entering
the PIN code. It is also possible to use the card for customer authentication in
commercial applications: for example, some post, bank, and loyalty applications
can be accessed with the card.
Privacy considerations have been taken into account in the design of the
card. For instance, FINUID is not the same as the social security number, nor can
it be used for deriving the social security number, unless the service provider has
access to the PRC data. On the other hand, the social security number is printed
on the front of the card, and is therefore available to anyone who gets physical
access to the card.
Since June 2005, FINEID cards are based on the Java Card technology [24].
The technology enables running several programs (Java Card applets) on the
card and downloading new applets on the chip in the post-issuance phase of
the card’s lifetime. Post-issuance downloading of applets has, however, security
implications associated with the bytecode verification of downloaded programs
[73]. Bytecode verification, which is a static analysis of the applet, is a crucial
component of the Java security model. If a malicious applet (which contains
3http://www.asiaiccardforum.org
4See, e.g., http://www.realnightmare.org
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ill-typed operations, for example) can bypass bytecode verification, it can po-
tentially enable a security attack. Because smart cards are resource-constrained
devices, and the standard bytecode verification algorithm requires a considerable
(and a priori unlimited) amount of random-access memory, many cards do not
implement it. Partly due to this fact, users are not allowed to install new applets
on their FINEID cards. Electronic use of the card is therefore currently restricted
by the features of the FINEID applet only.
The card itself is hardly the weakest link in the security of the scheme whereby
an eID is used for online user authentication. Indeed, a much easier attack vector
for an adversary is to concentrate efforts on the computer at which the card is
used. Normally, in order to access an online service, the user inserts her FINEID
card into the card reader, opens the relevant web page, and enters her PIN in
a dialogue window displayed by the card reader software. It is important to
note here that the card does not authenticate the card reader software, but only
checks the correctness of the PIN supplied to it. Therefore, malicious software
that wangles the user’s PIN code once (e.g., by intercepting keyboard events)
can use it later to impersonate the user to any online services as long as the
card is in the reader. Having intercepted the signature PIN, malware can sign
any documents on the user’s behalf. It should be noted that such signatures
have the same validity as hand-written signatures. Arguably, the main reason
why such attacks have not been mounted (or reported) so far is the relatively
low penetration of eID cards, both in the number of users and in the number of
available services.
SIM cards
The SIM is a smart card intended initially for mobile user (or rather user’s device)
authentication by the MNO. This card, owned by the MNO, is one of the best
known and widespread applications for smart cards. At the same time, it works
as a good illustration of “mobile identity”.
A mobile user’s subscriber ID can in some cases be used as the customer ID
in other business scenarios. Relying on the authentication of the SIM card in the
phone, MNOs can establish trust between the user and a third-party company.
The most usual application here is roaming, where the third-party company
is a mobile operator in a foreign country; other applications include access to
wireless local area network (WLAN) networks [111], mobile payment systems, or
services relying on positioning through mobile phone [31]. Some banks even
use the mobile phone as an additional channel for requesting confirmation codes
for payments initiated through usual Internet banking [108]. This works as a
trusted path between the bank and the user, preventing phishing or MITM attacks.
In Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) networks, user authenti-
cation is based on a secret key, commonly denoted as Ki , shared between the SIM
card and the MNO. The 3GPP project has developed a framework called Generic
Authentication Architecture (GAA) [39], which enables the bootstrapping of
credentials from this cellular authentication key and their reuse for authorising
access to other services. The system is easy to deploy, is based on open standards,
and can be used in both online and proximity scenarios [70]. Nonetheless, the
architecture is not open in the sense that service providers must sign agreements
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with the MNO in order to deploy GAA. In addition, the use of authentication based
on the SIM card and associated PIN code is rather limited because it is not fully
reliable. The PIN is requested only on power-on, and if the phone is stolen or lost,
it is usually ready to be used by anyone. Therefore, for stronger authentication,
SIM Application Toolkit (SAT) [1] applets with extra PIN codes are used.
SAT applets can be employed in two-factor authentication based on something
that the user has (the phone or, more exactly, the SIM card inside it), and
something that the user knows (the service-specific PIN entered on the phone
keyboard every time prior to use of the service). A good example of such use is
the authorization of payments in mobile payment systems and mobile banking.
The MNO can send data to a SAT applet in a standard Short Message Service
(SMS) message. SMS messages marked as “SIM data download” in their protocol
identifier header are forwarded by the mobile equipment (ME) to the SIM card.
Having received the message, the applet on the SIM card can process it and
request additional information from the user, by driving the ME user interface.
The applet can further create and send a message to the MNO. Both incoming
and outgoing messages can be encrypted under a key known to the SIM and the
SIM toolkit server [2]. PKI-SIM cards use SAT features for checking the user’s PIN
prior to signing a challenge with the user’s private key stored on the card. This
process is depicted in Fig. 2.
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MNO's authentication 
service
Phone number
SMS
message
SMS
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Parse header, 
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Figure 2: Mobile user authentication using a SAT applet on the SIM.
The first mobile signature solutions were based partly on proprietary tech-
nologies. In 2003, European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)
produced a set of Mobile commerce (M-COMM) standards [35–38], after which
most solutions were updated to conform to them. The mobile signature is defined
by ETSI as “A universal method for using a mobile device to confirm the intention
of a citizen to proceed with a transaction”.
PKI-SIM with a national eID applet
The SIM card can work also as an officially recognised ID. In at least Estonia,
Finland, and Turkey a mobile subscription customer can request a national eID-
compatible PKI-SIM card from their MNO. Such a card can be used for mobile user
authentication, and for creating digital signatures legally equal to handwritten
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ones. At the moment, two operators in Finland issue such PKI-SIM cards. The
system works in the following way.
Card issuance A customer receives a PKI-SIM card containing two private keys
(generated on the card) from her MNO. The keys are stored within a SAT ap-
plet used for customer authentication. At this point, no public-key certificates
corresponding to these keys exist. The certificates are produced and officially
registered in the FINEID directory in the second step, when the customer registers
her SIM card at a police station.
User authentication In order to authenticate a customer, the service provider
sends an authentication request to the MNO’s authentication service. The operator
sends a challenge to the customer’s phone in an SMS message, as described above.
The SAT applet asks the user to enter her PIN code to access the private key, signs
the challenge, and sends the response back to the MNO in an SMS message. The
operator checks the response and informs the service provider about the result
of the authentication.
The advantages of the ETSI standards-based platform include its compatibility
with almost any GSM mobile phone, and the availability of all the needed infras-
tructure. However, there are also certain drawbacks in the current approach.
For example, authentication cannot be done without the participation of the
MNO, and naturally operators charge both customers and service providers for
authentication. Apparently, this is a major threshold for joining the system: in
Finland, the system has been in place for already more than three years, yet
only a few service providers and about 200 people use it. In addition, using MNO
services for every transaction increases latency.
Authentication and transaction handling can also be done without relying
on MNO services [67, 77]. Indeed, the SIM card can be accessed straight from
software residing on the mobile phone, without any external data connection.
Combined with proximity technologies such as Bluetooth, NFC and IrDA, used
for connecting to a service provider or a peer, such SIM card access enables
architectures that do not require MNO services for every single transaction. Still,
as the SIM card remains the property of the MNO, support for such architectures
must be provided by the operator. Essentially this means that the MNO has to
install a SAT applet on their SIM cards.
Online identities
For most online services, the prevalent authentication tool is currently the
login and password pair. Although such authentication is easy to implement for
service providers, and easy to understand for users, it has a number of widely
acknowledged usability and security problems [6, Sect. 2.4]. People who use
many online services have difficulties in remembering passwords for them, and
therefore often pick passwords that are easy to remember [17]. For an attacker,
such passwords may be easy to guess. Enforcing good passwords by measuring
their quality helps only partially, because many people re-use their passwords in
a number of different accounts [60]. An attacker who has access to the password
data of one online service (e.g., a website administrator) can try the passwords at
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other places. Furthermore, passwords are often stolen through social engineering
attacks such as phishing.
Phishing attacks have been extensively used against users of Internet banking
services. This comes as no surprise, taking into account the extreme popularity of
Internet banking, the lack of phishing detection mechanisms in earlier browser
versions, and the fact that even experienced computer users have difficulties in
telling fraudulent and genuine banking websites apart [30]. One-time passwords
used by many banks in Finland and other countries can also be harvested.
To overcome these problems, some banks supply their users with tamper-
proof hardware authentication tokens that generate one-time passwords once
in a minute or half a minute. Such passwords are essentially useless in passive
phishing, because they expire quickly. Even better security can be achieved with
two-factor authentication or three-factor authentication [43], by combining
hardware tokens with PIN-entry pads and/or biometric authentication (see, e.g.,
[9]).
However, such authentication can prove insufficient in the case of real-time
MITM phishing. Having established a session between the user and the bank, and
controlling it, the attacker can modify the contents of messages sent between
the parties. This problem can be solved with the use of out-of-band channels. As
was already mentioned on p. 25, prior to accepting a payment order the bank
can send a confirmation code to the user in an SMS message. The message must
also contain essential information about the payment, such as the beneficiary
account number and the amount, because these might have been modified by
the MITM.
2.1.4 Identity management
It is not easy to handle large numbers of different user accounts in different
services and the partial identities associated with them. It is even more difficult
to remember all the passwords and PINs for access to these services. Bad usability
often leads to decreased security and privacy. Furthermore, users’ frustration
can discourage them from continuing to use the service, which may have a clear
economic impact on the service provider.
The purpose of identity management solutions is to establish environments
and rules for handling the partial identities of users [28]. This includes the
specification of procedures for identity life cycle management, and protocols for
identity proofs and other information exchange between participating parties
[64]. In a mobile business, identity management can be used for developing
services that follow the user from device to device, location to location, and
context to context [99].
Identity federations
Recently, the usability of credentials handling in the online world has somewhat
improved with the introduction of identity federations. These enable the reuse of
credentials within security domains of different service providers. It is therefore
enough for a user to authenticate with only one service provider to access the
services of other providers belonging to the same federation. This mechanism
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is called single sign-on (SSO). Specifications for the exchange of authentication
and authorisation data can be based on a number of standards and architectures
[75, 84, 91, 101]. All of them define distributed architectures with no central
authority. There can be many identity providers in the system, handling user
authentication and supplying assertions to service providers. Assertions can con-
tain authentication statements, authorisation decision statements, or (identity)
attribute statements. The identity provider can be located anywhere, as long
as it can supply assertions to service providers. In particular, this means that
the identity provider can also reside on a user’s personal authentication device,
enabling user-centric identity management [3, 65].
Multi-application smart cards
Multi-application smart cards can be thought of as an identity federation-
enabling technology, with multiple identities stored on a single card. Multi-
application smart card operating systems have been available since 2002 [98,
Sect. 5.1]. Despite this, the number of cards in the wallet of an ordinary per-
son has been growing. Although many cards are multifunctional (for example,
Malaysian identity card includes 8 applications), downloading new applications
in the post-issuance phase of the card life-cycle is generally not allowed.
The reasons for this are many. The main technological issue has for a long
time been the lack of on-card bytecode verification, a basic check that newly
downloaded applications have to undergo to ensure the security of other ap-
plications on the same card. Currently, though, many cards feature on-board
bytecode verification. Another technological problem has been the shortage of
standard smart card terminals in many business places. The global introduction
of chip-based payment cards has now fixed this issue. One more problem is
the lack of trust between service providers, which are are often competitors of
each other, and therefore do not allow the downloading of other applications on
their cards. Furthermore, the card itself usually bears the issuer’s logo and hence
works as a valuable marketing tool.
In a study [96] performed at our department, the reasons for the slow
adoption of multi-application smart cards in Finland were investigated through
an online survey. Issuers of common Finnish loyalty cards were invited to fill in
a form with questions about their awareness of the multi-application smart card
technology, and the main reasons for not taking it into use. It turned out that the
main problem was the lack of trust in cards distributed by competitors: 84.5%
clearly objected to the installation of their applets on such cards. Nonetheless,
many issuers would accept the downloading of their applets on cards issued by
banks (73.7% of issuers) or a national identity system provider (78.9%).
To summarise, user-centric identity management using multi-application
smart cards is currently all but nonexistent, and there is no clear solution to the
problem of trust between potential competitors.
Privacy-enhancing technologies
Privacy-enhancing technologies (PET) is an umbrella term for algorithms, pro-
tocols and systems that prevent the undesired dissemination and processing of
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personal information, thereby increasing privacy. The development of PET for
information systems was started by Chaum, who published his seminal paper
[23] on the topic in 1985. The cryptographic techniques used in PET include blind
signatures (presented first in [22]) and zero-knowledge protocols (invented in
[47]). For the latter, commitment schemes, introduced first in [15], are normally
used.
Users can utilise different pseudonyms for interacting with different organi-
sations. This provides unlinkability of transactions. Furthermore, pseudonyms
can be formed in a way that enables the building of anonymous credentials
which prove to one organisation the user’s relationship with another organisa-
tion [76]. Such credentials can be for one-time use [14], or for unlimited use
[19] (multiple-show credentials). Moreover, the lending of credentials to other
users can be made unattractive. This is achieved by forcing all credentials to be
released if the user lends only one credential [92].
In PET-based identity systems a person can make flexible proofs about the
values of identity attributes. In particular, integer commitment schemes (e.g.,
[27]) enable the construction of protocols which allow a person’s age to be
proved to be in a certain interval without revealing any more information about
it [12, 20]. Similar properties can also be achieved for proofs regarding textual
information [13]. Commitments to identity attribute values can be issued by
trusted authorities, and placed in certificates, for example [74].
On the whole, the state of public research into the mechanisms for anonymity,
unobservability, and unlinkability is considered by some to be very good [94].
The implementations [18] and practical use of such systems are, however, still
scarce despite the existing recommendations for using the “design for privacy”
principle in new systems [107].
The applicability of PET to ordinary identity documents is limited by the fact
that most officially recognised identity proofs require biometric authentication
(commonly, based on the photo). Clearly, if biometric patterns are read in elec-
tronic form, unlinkability stops here, because colluding service providers can
exchange biometric patterns and easily combine all the information associated
with them.
Mobile identity tools
A number of identity management systems have been developed for mobile de-
vices. For example, a tool called iManager [116] enables the user to manage her
partial identities on a personal digital assistant (PDA). It automatically offers the
selection of a suitable identity for every use case and controls the dissemination
of extra personal information to service providers. Most currently available tools
(see a study in [82]) are designed only for online business scenarios. Further-
more, most of the schemes concentrate on communication privacy, while no
special attention is paid to the security of storage for identity profiles.
There are three basic ways of storing identity profiles on mobile devices. The
unprotected memory of the device is suitable as a data storage for non-critical
applications. For example, mobile browsers can store passwords and data for
filling forms on the Internet. Another, more secure way is to use secure mobile
environments [5, 103], trusted platform modules [109] or embedded smart
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cards. Yet another option is to store identity-related information on the SIM card
[67].
If identity profiles are stored on the SIM card, they can be easily moved
from one device to another. However, this comes at a cost. Because the SIM is
controlled by the MNO, other service providers can install their applications only
if they sign agreements with the MNO. This may be a show-stopper for non-profit
organisations which wish to develop their mobile services.
In contrast, secure mobile environments enable the building of fully open mo-
bile identity management schemes. Nokia’s OnBoard Credentials (ObC) [34] is an
example of such a scheme. It provides mechanisms for the secure provisioning of
credentials, based on a device-specific keypair created during the manufacturing
process. In addition, ObC supports the secure provisioning of small programs
written in a lightweight version of the Lua programming language [58]. Sensitive
information is stored within the M-Shield secure environment [103], which is a
proprietary solution. As at the time of writing M-Shield has not passed a Com-
mon Criteria certification (while most SIM cards have passed it), this might be a
problem for deploying bank-issued credentials. For most applications, however,
the platform appears to be very useful and flexible. Currently, credentials cannot
be easily moved from phone to phone, but there are no apparent obstacles for
adding this feature in the future.
If a mobile identity tool was to be widely deployed, the mobile phone would
probably be the most suitable device for this [78]. Indeed, because most people
already have mobile phones, no extra hardware is needed for the launch of the
system. Mobile phones also feature security elements: SIM cards and embedded
security environments (in many models). Furthermore, users are familiar with
the interfaces of their devices. This can have a positive impact on the usability of
new solutions. All the required software can be distributed over-the-air by the
MNOs [102]. If the tool is made open for use by any identity or service provider,
it would have the potential for wide acceptance.
2.2 Mobile payments
The huge popularity of mobile phones has stimulated ideas for using them as
a payment instrument. A mobile payment is defined as “any payment where a
mobile device is used in order to initiate, activate, and/or confirm this payment”
[68]. For MNOs, the benefits of mobile payments include increased volumes of
chargeable data communication and improved attractiveness of the subscription.
In addition, they can provide value-added services by acting as payment media-
tors. For merchants, mobile payments can allow them to reduce the number of
staff normally required for selling items or for taking care of vending machines.
For users, mobile payments often improve the usability of services and save them
the need to have money or credit cards always at hand. Indeed, as one user
commented on the introduction of mobile ticketing for public transport in the
Helsinki area, “this is the greatest invention since the microwave oven”.
The development of mobile banking and mobile payments has been the most
popular research topic of all m-commerce applications [86]. Dozens of systems
31
Chapter 2. Literature review
have been developed, and many of them are in active use. We provide a brief
overview of their features here, concentrating mostly on security properties.
2.2.1 Security and privacy requirements
Industrial consortia consider security to be the basic requirement if mobile pay-
ments are to be valid and adopted by all stakeholders. The security and privacy
requirements of the participants in a mobile payment scheme are different, and
therefore we must first define these participants.
There are at least two parties in a mobile payment transaction: a customer
(payer) and a merchant (payee). In addition, banks or other financial institutions
can participate in the transaction to manage the money flow. Essentially, the mo-
bile payment facilitates the logical money flow from an account at the customer’s
bank (called issuer) to an account at the merchant’s bank (called acquirer). These
parties are common to standard digital payments [8]. The mobile payment,
however, often introduces yet another party, namely the MNO, who can partly
control the money flow, acting as an issuer of the customer’s electronic account.
Furthermore, many mobile payment systems use an additional mediator as a
payment service provider.
Mobile payments inherit many security and privacy requirements from usual
electronic payment systems. One important requirement, namely non-repudiation,
is shared by all of the parties. None of them should be able to deny the completion
of a payment transaction if the transaction has, in fact, occurred [80]. Another
common requirement is message integrity, which ensures that payment data are
not altered.
For the customer, both the technical and perceived level of security and
privacy should be high. Most importantly, customers should not suffer financial
losses due to impersonation or other attacks. For privacy protection, confiden-
tiality of the information about transactions is needed. Sensitive information
should be provided only on a need-to-know basis. In a “perfect” payment system,
merchants do not learn the identities of their customers. Furthermore, issuers,
acquirers and MNOs do not learn the identities of the customers and merchants
for any given transaction, and do not receive any information about the names,
prices and locations of the items purchased. Clearly, sensitive data must also be
protected against eavesdropping or modification by third parties.
Although technically possible, such “perfect” mobile payment systems are
still an utopia in the current world. Normally, security is established through
a number of authentication events and authorisation proofs dispatched by the
parties. We list these requirements here, following [10].
The issuer normally requires a proof of transaction authorisation by the
customer. The proof includes the customer’s and merchant’s identities, and the
amount of money to be paid. In order to establish the authenticity of the proof,
effective customer authentication is required.
In many cases, the issuer or acquirer may require a proof of transaction
authorisation by the merchant. Because merchants are often charged for the
transaction, this proof is needed to show that they consent to the future payment.
Conversely, the merchant might need a proof of transaction authorisation by
the acquirer or issuer, to ensure that the money will eventually arrive at the
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merchant’s bank account. In some cases, to enable off-line transactions, a proof
of transaction authorisation provided by the customer will suffice.
The customer must be protected against paying to a rogue merchant, or to
a party impersonating a valid merchant. Therefore, merchant authentication is
important. Furthermore, certification of the merchant is needed in some cases.
Just as in usual payments, the merchant has to issue a receipt for the money
accepted, and provide the purchased items.
In many systems some of these requirements are not implemented. This is
due to various reasons, the most common of which is choosing usability instead
of security or privacy. Indeed, ideal systems are hard to find in the real world, and
the situation with mobile payments is no different. Trade-offs between usability
and security are very common, and therefore there is no (and perhaps will never
be) a system good for all scenarios.
2.2.2 Mobile payment schemes
Mobile payment systems can be categorised in several ways. Since extensive
classification of systems is not a goal of this work, we refer the reader to com-
prehensive summaries of mobile payment procedures [68, 69, 79] for details.
Here we provide only an overview of possible classification criteria, to show the
diversity of payment schemes.
First, the systems may be classified by the sizes of supported payments into
micro-, mini-, or macro-payments. There is no standard definition of limits, but
the rule of thumb is that micro-payments are of less than $2, macro-payments
are over $20, and mini-payments fit in between. Most simple mobile payment
systems support micro- and mini-payments. If there is a payment mediator
involved, macro-payments also can be supported.
The second way of classification is by transaction type. Transactions can be
categorised by their dependence on user location into remote and local/proximity.
If no contact to an external entity (such as an issuer or mediator) is needed
during transactions, they can be performed off-line, and otherwise only on-line.
Transactions can also be divided into pre-paid, pay-now, and post-paid, depending
on the time when the actual money transfer is done. Payment systems can support
these transaction types in different combinations.
Additional division of mobile payment systems into groups is done according
to the platforms and technologies involved in their implementation, as illustrated
in Fig. 3. In the next subsection we provide an overview of mobile payment
solutions with regard to their security.
2.2.3 Security of payments
One can see from the requirements given in subsection 2.2.1 that for business
priorities, effective customer authentication is the most important element. How
well do currently prevalent mobile payment systems satisfy this requirement?
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Figure 3: Mobile payments: a summary of enabling technologies.
The simplest mobile payment systems
The simplest and most common systems are based on calling or sending an SMS to
a premium phone number. The payment amount is then added to the phone bill.
Such systems are offered by virtually all MNOs in the world, and their popularity
is explained by the ease of use. However, SMS or call based systems normally
support only micro- and mini-payments, placing a limit on the maximum value.
This is because such systems do not strongly authenticate the customer, and
thus lack a non-repudiation mechanism. Indeed, the customer authentication is
based on the PIN code, which is checked once on power-on of the mobile phone.
Considering that most phones are always on, they can be used for payments
if lost or stolen, or even left unattended for a few minutes. Protection against
such misuse is only provided by the shift of liability: customers are financially
responsible for all payments, unless the SIM is blocked by contacting the MNO.
However, the customers can still claim that payments were generated by a rogue
insider, and the MNO might have a hard time proving otherwise.
Mediator-based mobile payment systems
Instead of relying exclusively on the mobile subscription, many mobile payment
systems (e.g., Fundamo5, Macalla6, MoreMagic7) introduce an extra payment
service provider, called a mediator. Users can choose to charge their payments to
a separate pre-paid account managed by the mediator, and register their credit or
debit cards for topping up this account for future payments. Moreover, mediators
can facilitate cross-border and cross-operator payments when the customer is
using network roaming.
Many mediators provide additional security by introducing an extra PIN
which is used for confirming payments (e.g. Mobipay8, Telemoney9). Before a
5http://www.fundamo.com
6http://www.macalla.com
7http://www.moremagic.com
8http://www.mobipay.com
9http://telemoney.com.sg
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transaction is made, its details (such as the price of the products, and name of
the shop) are sent to the user. The user must supply the service-specific PIN to
accept the payment.
Although systems that use extra PINs provide additional authentication of the
user, they do not solve all security problems. The non-repudiation of transactions
is still insufficient. Indeed, users can still theoretically claim that they never
entered the PIN, and it was the MNO who confirmed the transaction.
SAT-based security
SAT applets, the mechanism already described in section 2.1.3, is used by some
mobile payment systems (e.g., Fundamo or Vodafone M-Platby) for performing
customer authentication. However, most such systems are based on symmetric
key cryptography rather than on public key infrastructure (PKI): the secret key
is shared between the SIM card and the payment system provider. Again, the
customer has to confirm payments by entering the payment service-specific PIN
code. Then, the SAT applet creates a transaction certificate, which is encrypted
using the shared key and submitted to the payment system provider.
Such systems feature only slightly better non-repudiation than those de-
scribed above. In fact, because the secret key is shared between the SIM and the
payment service provider, it is still possible for the customer to claim that the
transaction has not taken place.
PKI-based mobile payment systems
A few mobile payment systems (e.g., Telenor’s MobilHandel10) use mobile PKI for
customer authentication, providing much better non-repudiation of transactions.
These systems are similar to those described in the previous paragraph; however,
the proof of transaction authorisation is signed with the customer’s private key
instead of being encrypted with a shared key.
It is important to note that the PKIs used in these systems are usually main-
tained by MNOs. Unless the MNO is an officially certified qualified certificate issuer,
electronic signatures produced by SIM cards are not legally equal to hand-written
signatures, and therefore do not provide an ultimate solution to the problem
of non-repudiation. In addition, any merchant who wishes to support mobile
payments has to sign agreements with all the MNOs providing such service. Al-
ternatively, MNOs can sign a mobile signature roaming agreement, enabling the
merchant to use services of only one MNO.
Several systems use bank-issued customer credentials. Their use is restricted
by the fact that credentials are stored on a separate card, and therefore a dual-
card or dual-slot phone, or one with an external card reader interface is needed.
The availability of such phones is rather limited.
Proximity payments
Short-range communication technologies (such as Bluetooth, NFC, or infrared
communication) offer new possibilities for the development of mobile payment
10http://telenormobil.no/mobilhandel
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systems. Off-line payment systems can be easily designed, and transaction times
significantly decreased. The first proximity payment systems used infrared con-
nection, whereas new systems use RFID or NFC. For example, MasterCard PayPass
and Visa Wave support payments using the mobile phone in the RFID card simu-
lation mode. The security of these systems strongly depends on the resistance of
RFID chips against cloning and tampering. The mechanisms for user authentica-
tion and transaction non-repudiation are weak, so for macro payments the use
of PINs or digital signatures is demanded.
Recently, ETSI accepted a set of standards [40, 41] defining an interface
between the SIM and contactless front-ends (NFC). The standards describe pro-
cedures for contactless access to applications residing on the SIM, enabling the
development of new types of proximity payment systems. From the user’s perspec-
tive, this turns mobile phones into a new form of contactless multi-application
smart card.
It is interesting to compare new proximity mobile payment systems with
standard credit card payments. In the last few years, the industry has largely
switched to using chip cards. The impact of the switch on card fraud losses has
been two-fold. In the UK, for example, fraud on lost or stolen cards and on
face-to-face transactions has clearly decreased, while the use of counterfeit cards
abroad has rocketed [7]. The connection is clear: being unable to clone the chips
of new cards, fraudsters have continued cloning magnetic stripes, and switched
to raising money abroad. This type of fraud may become more difficult with the
global introduction of chip cards and terminals.
However, new vectors for attacks have already been devised. They are based
on the manipulation of payment terminals: namely, a fraudster can mount a
MITM attack using a rogue terminal, lying about the amount and purpose of
the payment [32]. The terminal displays the correct amount of money, and the
customer enters her PIN without any suspicion. However, the actual payment
data contain another amount and are relayed to a different merchant. Clearly,
the problem here is the lack of a trustworthy user interface.
Moreover, the manipulation of terminals can be used for collecting card
details and PINs [33], for later use in other types of attacks. Since there are many
models of PIN-entry devices with different user interfaces, a common user can
hardly tell fraudulent and legitimate terminals apart.
Attacks involving fraudulent terminals can be expected to work with current
proximity mobile payment systems. However, in all the other systems described
in this section (except the simplest ones), these attacks are more difficult. Indeed,
to mount them, the attacker has to modify information about the transaction as
displayed on the mobile phone screen. Unless this is achieved by penetrating the
phone with a virus or trojan, or by attacking the MNO-phone link, the display
provides trustworthy information about the payment. The customer can check
all the details on the screen before accepting the transaction. It is therefore easy
for the customer to notice any difference in the details displayed by a fraudulent
terminal and the actual payment data.
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Aims of the study
3.1 Motivation
The present study was undertaken to provide a number of improvements to the
currently prevalent identity management and mobile payment procedures.
Initially, the study started from the observation that the security of GSM
networks is essentially focused on the segment between the mobile equipment
and the base station. At the same time, the traffic in the operators’ networks
is in plaintext, in principle allowing insiders in the MNO organisation to easily
modify or eavesdrop on it. In turn, this means that the system does not provide
sufficient non-repudiation of transactions handled through it, unless additional
security is built on the higher levels. Although the confidentiality of message
traffic can be rather easily achieved with encryption, key management becomes
a problem. For sound non-repudiation, the use of digital signatures is required.
At the time when our study was started, national mobile PKI had already been
launched, and we began investigating whether it was possible to utilise it for
providing message security. It turned out that the system was rather closed and
centred around MNO services built using proprietary solutions. We considered
this to be inappropriate, because in our view national systems should be open to
use by any service providers and their customers.
We also began examining the level of privacy protection provided by MNO-
centred authentication systems, and comparing them with other electronic
identity solutions. It turned out that despite the availability of privacy-enhancing
technologies, none of them has been applied in the design of current electronic
identity systems.
Additional motivation was provided by the idea of combining several identity
tokens into a single multifunctional identity tool. Identity federations, widely
used on the Internet, have their counterpart in the “physical” world: multi-
application smart cards have been available for almost a decade. However,
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their actual use is rather limited. Post-issuance downloading of new applications,
which could have been used for more advanced identity management, is disabled
in most such cards. Having witnessed the exceptionally slow start of systems
built around multi-application smart cards, we set out to design a tool similar to
them but working on the mobile phone and open for use by anyone.
* * *
Although they have been available for 4–5 years, electronic identity documents
and identity management solutions are still in their infancy. There have been
some improvements since the release of the first versions but many electronic ID
documents are still neither widely accepted by citizens nor extensively employed
in new services. Most importantly, officially recognised electronic IDs do not
provide sufficient protection of their holder’s privacy. Indeed, a considerable
amount of information about a person’s identity is often revealed to people who
only need a tiny part of it. Although privacy-enhancing technologies exist in
the electronic world, they have not so far been used for facilitating officially
recognised identity proofs.
Several mobile identity tools have been developed, but most of them are
targeted at helping users to manage their on-line identities. No special attention
has been paid in creating such tools to the protection of the storage medium for
identity-related information. The only prominent exception to this rule, Nokia’s
OnBoard Credentials, is based on a proprietary solution that has not passed the
certification required for its use in officially recognised identity proofs.
The mobile payment is a good example of mobile identity applications.
Despite the diversity of currently available mobile payment systems, only a few
of them use advanced security technologies for efficient customer authentication
and non-repudiation of transactions. In all of them authentication is carried
out through services provided by the mobile network operator. This makes the
systems difficult to join by merchants and financial service providers, increases
the cost of payments, and decreases transaction speeds. They are being widely
promoted as the “next big thing”, but the proximity payment systems currently
on the market do not feature strong security mechanisms and are therefore used
normally only for micro- and mini-payments.
3.2 Research hypotheses
The research is based on the following three hypotheses, each split into three
claims.
Research hypothesis 1: Strong mobile user authentication
(a) Strong authentication of mobile users can be performed by employing a
national electronic identity system and corresponding infrastructure.
(b) The authentication of mobile users can be done without using the authen-
tication services of mobile network operators.
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(c) Systems that rely on such authentication can be fully open and easy to join
by any customer, mobile network operator, service provider, and financial
institution.
Research hypothesis 2: Pseudonymous mobile identity
(a) A national electronic identity system can be used for building a general
user and citizen identification and authentication system for access control.
(b) Such a mobile identity can be securely used in many applications instead
of usual identification cards or passports.
(c) Privacy in systems that use such a mobile identity can be higher than in
systems that use usual identification cards and passports.
Research hypothesis 3: Open mobile identity
(a) A mobile phone with a security element such as the SIM card is a suitable
device for becoming a ubiquitous mobile identity management tool.
(b) The tool can facilitate flexible identity proofs using chosen identity profiles.
(c) Such tool can be open to use by any identity providers and identity verifiers.
3.3 Research methods
The first part of the study was exploratory, with the goal of defining concepts and
analysing the state of the art. This part pointed out problems in and drawbacks of
the currently available solutions. The second part was constructive, developing
new architectures for solving the problems identified in the first part. The de-
veloped solutions were then evaluated using proof-of-concept implementations.
The main part of the work was constructive.
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Results
4.1 Mobile user authentication
In GSM networks, user authentication is based on a secret key (Ki) which is
shared between the SIM card and the MNO. Theoretically, this is a two-factor
authentication, based on something that the user has (the SIM) and something
that the user knows (the corresponding PIN). In practise, however, PINs are
normally entered only once on power-on. Therefore, authentication is not strong
enough for some mobile services, as it does not provide a sufficient level of
non-repudiation of transactions.
An easy way to overcome this problem is to use SAT applets (see Sect. 2.1.3).
Such authentication is employed in officially recognised solutions such as Mobiil-
ID in Estonia and similar systems in Finland and Turkey. MNO services are used
for sending the challenge to the user’s mobile device, receiving and interpreting
the response, and reporting the result of authentication. While the scheme is
indisputably practical for many use cases, in our view it is logically controversial.
Indeed, as the mobile phone is a smart card terminal with a keyboard, why use
MNO communication and authentication services for accessing the SIM?
4.1.1 Data flow
The goal of study I was to provide confidentiality and non-repudiation of SMS
messages. We planned to use the FINEID PKI in order to avoid the key man-
agement problems common in systems that use symmetric encryption. By the
time we started the work, PKI-SIM cards with FINEID functionality had become
available. However, their functionality was based on the M-COMM standards (see
Sect. 2.1.3). In order to provide a similar functionality without the use of the
MNO’s authentication services, we developed the following model. As usual, the
user’s private key is generated on the SIM and stored on it in a SAT applet; this
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operation is performed by the MNO. The CA (the Finnish PRC) issues a public key
certificate to the corresponding public key. This certificate is stored in a public
directory accessible through the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP). In
order to use operations performed on the SIM with the private key, the following
structure for the data flow was developed (see Fig. 4).
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Figure 4: Mobile user authentication: technologies and data flow.
A Java 2 Mobile Edition (J2ME) applet, which we call the identity proxy,
provides a user interface for composing a text message, acquiring a signature
for it from the SIM-based applet, and sending it to another party1. The user’s PIN
is requested before a signature is calculated. The message is encrypted using
the recipient’s public key. This provides strong two-factor authentication of the
mobile user, and the non-repudiation, confidentiality and integrity of the text
message.
To enable communication between the SIM and a J2ME applet, we use the
security and trust services (SATSA) application programming interface (API) for
Java, defined in JSR-177 [62]. The API consists of four packages:
1. SATSA-APDU is an API that enables J2ME applets to communicate with smart
cards connected to the device. In communication, the application protocol
data unit (APDU) format of messages is used.
1In publication I, the order was the opposite, i.e. the message was first ciphered and only then
signed. We corrected this because it is good practice to sign the plaintext, as this proves that the
sender has seen the plaintext.
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2. SATSA-JCRMI enables an application to communicate with a smart card using
the Java Card Remote Method Invocation (JCRMI) protocol.
3. SATSA-PKI provides functions for the generation of digital signatures and
for user credential management. Keys are normally stored on smart cards
connected to the device.
4. SATSA-CRYPTO includes implementations of certain cryptographic primitives:
message digests, ciphers, and digital signatures. The API is a subset of the
Java 2 Standard Edition (J2SE) platform Java Cryptography Extension (JCE).
All these packages are optional; a device can implement any set of them. In
our architecture, we use only the package SATSA-APDU, for sending commands to
the applet running on the SIM, and receiving answers from it. The only operation
performed by the SIM-based applet is the calculation of a digital signature for
a given message. All other operations are performed in the identity proxy. The
word proxy is used because the application works as a logical interface between
the SIM-based applet and devices accessed through external communication
technologies. Such devices could be other mobile phones, payment terminals,
remote servers, or vending machines, for example.
4.1.2 Applications
Since the contents of SMS messages are available to MNOs in standard GSM
networks, the standard SMS is not a suitable communication service for sending
confidential information. The simplest application of the proposed scheme is
true end-to-end encryption of SMS messages. Correspondents can retrieve each
other’s public keys from the FINEID directory, which means that no exchange
of keys is required prior to communication. With a key size of 1024 bits (128
bytes), a 128-byte message fits in one binary SMS block (the maximum length of
which is 140 bytes). In addition, one SMS message is required for transmitting
the signature of the message with a timestamp.
The scheme can be also used for mobile payments; an outline for a vending
machine payment protocol is provided in the paper. This idea was further devel-
oped and protocols for a mobile payment system were designed in study II. To
summarise, any applications that require strong mobile customer authentication
can benefit from the scheme. In addition to authentication, the scheme can also
be used for acquiring the user’s signature for a short contract, or for a short digest
of a contract of any size. Computationally this is possible: many SIM cards have
cryptographic coprocessors which allow 1024-bit signatures to be calculated in
less than 200 ms.
4.1.3 Evaluation
The functionality of the scheme is similar to that of M-COMM standards developed
by ETSI, because both schemes provide services for two-factor authentication of
the mobile user and mobile signatures. In addition, our scheme provides end-to-
end encryption for SMS messages, the contents of which become unreadable by
the MNO.
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The most significant difference between the schemes is in their implemen-
tation. Our scheme does not use authentication services provided by the MNO:
only standard (packet-based and SMS) communication goes through the mobile
network. However, this comes at the cost of increased requirements on the user’s
device. The identity proxy J2ME applet uses the SATSA API which is available
only in newer mobile phone models. Furthermore, the usability of the scheme
is somewhat degraded by the need to install the identity proxy on the mobile
phone.
Although the scheme is not fully flexible, it works as a starting point for the
further research presented in this thesis. The architecture of the data flow is
used in other papers, in which the idea of storing user’s credentials on the SIM is
extended.
4.2 Mobile payment systems
Strong mobile user authentication and the related non-repudiation of trans-
actions facilitate the development of mobile payment systems that support
macro-payments and that can be used in both physical point of sale (POS) and
virtual POS scenarios. If a national PKI is utilised in the system, the payment
scheme can become open and easy to join by any financial service providers,
merchants, MNOs, and users. Publication II (preliminary results in [53]) presents
an open mobile payment scheme that is based on the Finnish national PKI, with
private keys stored on users’ SIM cards. The architecture for data flow presented
in the previous section is utilised.
4.2.1 Protocols and implementation
Our mobile payment system consists of two protocols, one of which is used for
physical POS payments, and one for virtual POS payments. Details of the protocols
are given in Sect. 4 of publication II; here we provide a brief overview.
The following parties interact in these payment protocols. A customer is a
user of a hand-held device who has received a PKI-SIM card with the function-
ality described in Sect. 4.1.1. A digital identifier of the customer is the Finnish
electronic user identity (FINUID).
A merchant is an owner of a POS terminal (or a vending machine) or a service
provider that accepts mobile payments online. The merchant has a private key
and a corresponding public key certificate registered in the FINEID system.
A bank or other credit organisation such as Visa or MasterCard is a financial
institution that processes payments. The customer has an account with the bank,
or has been issued with a credit card operated by it. If the customer has multiple
accounts with or credit cards issued by the bank, the bank is informed which
one to use for mobile payments. The bank has the right to charge the customer’s
account or credit card when presented with a payment order signed by the
customer’s private key. The customer cannot repudiate transactions in this case,
as his authorisation in the form of a PIN is required for unlocking the private key
with which transaction details are signed.
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Virtual POS payment
The virtual POS payment model that we present facilitates online payments from
a mobile phone. The user’s credentials stored on the SIM are used to confirm the
payments. A payment is initiated when the user browses a merchant’s website
and chooses to make a purchase. The overall payment model is depicted in
Fig. 5.
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Figure 5: Virtual POS payment model.
1. Service request The customer initiates the protocol with the merchant by
requesting product options. The request may contain information which limits
possible options.
2. Service options The merchant sends a list of options to the mobile device.
The list includes short descriptions of products and pricing information. The
merchant also attaches its certificate to the list of options.
3. Product selection The customer is prompted by the mobile device to select
a product from the list. While the customer is busy selecting a product, the
merchant’s certificate is verified. In addition to the product details, the following
information is included in the message sent to the merchant:
• Identifiers of the customer and the bank;
• A timestamp and a nonce generated by the customer;
• A signature confirming essential payment details: product description
(masked by hashing it with the nonce), payment amount, and identifier of
the merchant. The signature will be verified later by the bank.
To prevent the reuse of the signature by the merchant (the merchant could
send it to a number of other banks, hoping that the customer has accounts there)
to receive the payment several times, the signature must contain the bank’s
identifier2. IDBANK should therefore be part of the signature (see p. 220 of
publication II):
SIGCUSTBANK =

H(TIMECUST|IDMERCH|IDBANK|PRICE)|
H(PRODUCT|NONCECUST)	SKEYCUST .
The product order is signed with the customer’s private key. The product
description is included for enabling later adjudication in case of a dispute, and is
masked to hide its contents from the bank.
2Tuomas Aura is gratefully acknowledged for the suggestion of this correction.
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4. Payment request The merchant sends details of the payment to the bank.
They include the identifiers of the merchant and the customer, payment amount,
masked product description, and the payment order (a signed message received
from the customer in the previous phase). The payment request is signed with
the merchant’s private key.
5. Payment confirmation The bank performs all the necessary checks on the
payment request and then transfers the indicated amount of money from the
buyer’s account to the seller’s account. The bank sends a notification to the
merchant, confirming that the payment was made with the agreed amount from
the account of the customer to the account of the merchant. The confirmation is
signed using the bank’s private key.
6. Product delivery The merchant forwards the payment confirmation to the
customer and delivers the product.
Proximity (real) POS payment
Our protocol for proximity POS (vending machine) payments is somewhat more
complicated. The reason for this is the assumption that the vending machine
is not connected to a network, all communication being handled through the
customer’s mobile phone. The customer acquires a proof of its certificate validity,
and delivers the payment receipt from the bank to the vending machine. Certifi-
cate validity proofs are provided in the form of digitally signed OCSP responses
[83]. The vending machine must have a public key certificate of the OCSP server
in order to check a response.
Because the vending machine might not have a reliable source of time, it
might be possible for the customer to replay an old OCSP token in a fresh message.
To avoid this we use a challenge-response scheme, where the vending machine
gives the customer a challenge for which the customer has to show a timestamped
response. For simplicity we propose to have one signature which ties together
the response, message, timestamp, and certificate validity statement.
An overview of our mobile payment model for vending machines is presented
in Fig. 6. The protocol involves nine steps (terms merchant and vending machine
are used interchangeably in the description).
1. Initiation The customer chooses a product, and specifies that mobile pay-
ment is to be used.
2. Bluetooth pairing In our model, we use Bluetooth as a communication
technology between the mobile phone and the vending machine. To enable the
exchange of messages, Bluetooth pairing must first be performed. If several
Bluetooth devices are in the range, the vending machine can generate a random
PIN and show it on the display for pairing. The customer must enter this PIN in
the mobile phone.
3. Product offer The vending machine sends a message with information
about available (or selected) products and their prices. Otherwise, the list of
products contains only the already selected item. In addition to this data, the
vending machine sends its own certificate and a random nonce which is used for
protection against replay attacks.
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Figure 6: Real POS (vending machine) payment model.
The customer extracts the merchant’s certificate and checks its validity. The
list of products is parsed and shown on the mobile phone display.
4. Product selection When the customer has selected a product, the informa-
tion about the product selection is sent to the vending machine. In addition, the
message contains a nonce generated by the mobile device, and the customer’s
certificate. A hash of the product selection and two nonces (the one received
from the vending machine, and the one generated by the mobile device) is signed
with the customer’s private key. Using this signature, the vending machine can
authenticate the customer.
The mobile phone must store the price of the selected product, as it will be
needed later for the payment.
5. Payment request The vending machine sends a payment request to the
customer. The request is signed using the vending machine’s private key.
The payment details include the account number, and an identifier of the
vending machine. The price of the product is not sent with the payment details,
since the customer already knows it. However, it is included in a hash in the
second part of the message, which is intended for the bank and includes a signed
hash of the customer’s certificate, the price of the product, and both transaction-
related nonces. This part works as a proof of the transaction authorisation by
the merchant, and prevents the customer from offering one certificate to the
merchant and another to the bank. The signed hash can also be stored by the
customer as a receipt from the vending machine. Combined with a receipt from
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the bank (sent in phase 7), it can be used later as a proof of the purchase if a
dispute arises.
After receiving the payment request, the customer verifies the merchant’s
signature on it.
6. Payment order The customer sends a payment order to the bank. The
payment order contains all the information received from the merchant in the
previous step. In addition, an account number of the customer, identifiers of the
merchant and the customer, a timestamp, and both transaction-related nonces
are included in the order. The payment order is sent to the bank encrypted with
the bank’s public key and signed with the customer’s private key.
7. Payment processing After receiving and decrypting the payment order, the
bank verifies signatures made by the customer and the merchant. Their public
keys are retrieved from the FINEID directory, using identifiers in the payment
order as the search criteria. In addition, the bank checks that neither of the
certificates is on the revocation list. If all necessary checks are passed, the bank
makes the money transfer. If the merchant’s account is in another bank, the usual
interbank procedures are used for crediting money to the merchant. When the
transaction has been processed, the bank sends a confirmation message (receipt)
to the customer.
The receipt provides proof that the payment has been made. The receipt
includes the bank account number of the merchant, the amount of money paid,
and transaction-related nonces. The receipt is signed using the bank’s private
key.
8. Proof of payment In phase 8, the mobile phone forwards the bank receipt
to the vending machine. In order to specify which bank’s public key must be used
for verification of the receipt, the bank’s identifier is included in the message. The
vending machine checks the receipt and delivers the product to the customer.
The vending machine must have a list of valid public keys of different banks.
If the vending machine does not have a network connection, the protocol may
be easily extended to include an OCSP proof of the bank certificate validity in the
proof of payment.
9. Product delivery The vending machine delivers the product, and marks the
transaction as processed.
Implementation
As a proof of concept, we designed and implemented a system for purchasing
train tickets using a mobile phone as described in the virtual POS payment
model. Software run by the customer’s mobile phone was written using J2ME in
Sun Wireless Toolkit (WTK) version 2.2 from Sun Microsystems. Routines that
involve cryptographic processing (such as encryption or handling public key
certificates) were implemented using Bouncy Castle API [106]. The SIM-based
applet responsible for signing the product selection and the payment order was
realised using JCOP tools running within the Eclipse IDE [57].
We used the usual bankcard-sized FINEID card in our tests, because the PKI-SIM
cards currently deployed by Finnish MNOs are based on the M-COMM standards.
To enable communication between the J2ME applet and the card, we developed a
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small mediator program which accepts commands arriving from the WTK, sends
them to the card, and forwards the card’s responses back to the WTK. For the WTK
this is completely transparent because the standard SATSA API is used.
No mobile phones implementing SATSA-APDU were available when our work
was done. Therefore, to test the application on a real mobile phone, we prepared
a modified version of the program, in which no access to the SIM is used. Instead,
the customer’s private key is stored, and operations on it performed in the
J2ME applet running on the mobile phone itself. Transaction speed and user
convenience was tested on a Nokia N91 phone. Retrieving train connections
that matched the search criteria from the server using General Packet Radio
Service (GPRS) communication took an average of 3.2 s. An average of 8.6 s
was required to create and send the order message and to receive and verify
the response message. Some of the response time was consumed by retrieving
and verifying certificate information. After this communication was moved to an
earlier stage (to be performed while the customer is choosing a suitable ticket),
the response time decreased to an average of 7.5 s. An implementation which
requests signatures from the SIM card could have a slightly different performance.
Signatures can be produced by modern SIM cards in less than 200 ms; some
additional time is required for the APDU exchange.
The time and effort required for Bluetooth pairing could negatively impact
the usability of the scheme. To avoid this, NFC could be used instead of Bluetooth
or in addition to it. The benefit of NFC is its shorter working distance (about
2 cm in current mobile phone implementations). In places where POS terminals
are placed close to each other, NFC provides an easier way to ensure that the
proper terminal is contacted. NFC can also be used to initiate and configure the
Bluetooth communication, using the recently introduced Connection Handover
specification3. The drawback, however, is that NFC is still supported by only a
few devices, whereas Bluetooth is already widespread.
4.2.2 Security, privacy and usability
Our mobile payment scheme satisfies the following security and privacy require-
ments. In the description, we follow the requirements listed in Sect. 2.2.1 and in
[10].
Bank requirements
Proof of transaction authorisation by customer The customer signs (with the
private key, access to which is authorised by the PIN) the payment order that
includes an identifier of the vendor, the amount of money to be paid, and a
timestamp. The signature provides an undeniable proof that the customer has
authorised the payment. Signatures are protected against replay attacks by
timestamps. Due to their legal acceptance, signatures can be used to resolve
disputes between the customer and the bank.
Proof of transaction authorisation by merchant Payment requests are signed
by the merchant using its private key. Payment requests cannot be replayed by
3http://www.nfc-forum.org/specs
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an external adversary or by the customer due to the use of timestamps (in the
virtual POS payment) or nonces (in the real POS payment).
Merchant requirements
Proof of transaction authorisation by customer After choosing a product or
service, the customer signs this selection using their private key. The signature is
an unforgeable proof that the customer has authorised the transaction.
Proof of transaction authorisation by bank If a transaction is successfully pro-
cessed, the bank generates and signs a receipt which is delivered to the merchant.
If the merchant does not receive the receipt, or if verification of the signature
fails, the product is not delivered to the customer. The merchant can store the
receipt as a proof of transaction authorisation by the bank. Replaying of bank
receipts is prevented by the use of timestamps and nonces.
Customer requirements
Unauthorised payment is impossible It is not possible to produce valid signatures
unless one possesses a practically unforgeable token (FINEID card) of the customer
and knows the PIN corresponding to it. The easiest way to obtain these is to learn
the PIN code by shoulder-surfing and then steal the phone. The security level is
thus comparable to that of automatic teller machine (ATM) cards. However, the
odds are that the phone can be missed by the customer considerably sooner than
an ATM card.
Proof of transaction authorisation by bank In both protocols the customer
receives a signed receipt from the bank. In case of a virtual POS payment, the
receipt is forwarded by the merchant to the customer. In a real POS payment, the
receipt is sent by the bank directly to the customer. Bank receipts are protected
against replays by the inclusion of timestamps and nonces.
Certification and authentication of merchant In our mobile payment scheme,
the customer receives the merchant’s certificate directly from the merchant.
The customer can check the certificate validity by submitting a query to the
FINEID directory. Messages that contain product selections are encrypted under
the merchant’s public key. Nonces are included in these messages, to enable
challenge-response authentication of the merchant. Unless the merchant pos-
sesses the private key associated with the public key in the certificate, it cannot
proceed with the payment protocol.
Receipt from merchant In a virtual POS payment the merchant forwards a signed
bank receipt to the customer. The receipt states that the bank has authorised the
payment, which in turn means that the merchant had asked for a payment and
thus agreed to deliver the product or service. It must be noted that the merchant
can always refuse to forward the bank receipt to the customer. However, in this
case the customer can use the next bank statement as a proof of purchase. In
a real POS payment, the customer receives two receipts: one from the vending
machine as an authorisation of the transaction, and one from the bank as a proof
of the payment.
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Privacy
In an ideal case, merchants should not learn the identities of their customers,
and banks should not receive any information about the products that their
customers purchase. Clearly, the confidentiality of the order and payment details
should be protected from eavesdropping. Our mobile payment scheme does
partially satisfy these requirements. Product selection details are sent from the
customer to the merchant in encrypted form, preventing eavesdropping. The
bank does not receive any information about the purchase except its price, and
the identities of the customer and the merchant. The merchant learns the identity
of the customer, and in a real POS payment also the name of the bank used by
the customer. These are the same details as in a normal credit card payment.
Usability
It is clear that there is no mobile payment system that is perfect for all purposes.
We believe that our system is good mostly for macro-payments, whereas for
mini- and midi-payments a simpler system (e.g. one based on sending an SMS or
making a call to a premium number) would suffice.
4.3 Open Mobile Identity
In everyday life, the identity profiles of a normal person range from a paper
business card to the most sophisticated bank and national eID cards. As discussed
in Sect. 2.1.3, the recent switch to e-IDs has mostly concentrated on the pre-
vention of forgery, whereas privacy issues have not been addressed properly.
The usability improvements have also been small, if any. At the same time, it
is reasonable to expect that we should be able to conduct various “identity
transactions” electronically with the same ease as we conduct them in various
face-to-face situations, such as exchanging business cards at a conference, but
with more convenience, better security and with a reasonable degree of privacy.
In particular, we should be able to identify ourselves in trivial situations such
as proving our right to a concession ticket on a bus, without revealing other
personal and in these circumstances non-relevant information such as name or
address.
However, none of the currently available identity tokens can tackle this
identity management problem appropriately. An ordinary electronic identity
document, such as an eID card or a biometric passport, normally contains only
a single identity profile. A significant amount of personal information is stored
there in a machine-readable form, and thus can be accessed instantaneously and
indiscriminatingly. Multifunctional identity tokens (such as the Malaysian eID
card) are rare, and their potential has not been exploited fully, as discussed in
Sect. 2.1.4.
But it does not mean that there is no bright future for the idea. We argue that
the emergence of mobile phones enriched with NFC technology is instrumental
for the development of a multifunctional mobile identity management tool which
can be used in proximity transactions. Moreover, the tool can be made ubiquitous,
51
Chapter 4. Results
covering more scenarios than usual eID tokens, and feature better usability. Thus,
it has the potential to become a truly personalised identity assistant.
4.3.1 Mobile terminal as a personalised electronic identity tool
In publication III we extend the idea of storing the user’s credentials on the
security element (such as the SIM card) in the hand-held device. We propose
using the combination of a SIM-based applet and the phone-based identity proxy
for providing flexible proofs of the user’s identity. Publication V further develops
this system, providing support for multiple identity profiles. An open mobile
identity tool is presented, where the notion of openness means that any identity
provider can load an identity profile to the user’s device.
As a highly personal gadget, the mobile phone has psychologically already
become a suitable device for facilitating identity proofs and mobile payments.
Also technologically, it is a reasonable tool for securely storing its user’s identity
profiles and communicating with identity verifiers and service providers. Indeed,
any GSM mobile phone contains a tamper-resistant secure element, the SIM
card. Many SIMs are certified according to the Common Criteria (ISO/IEC 15408)
standard, to evaluation assurance level EAL4+, and therefore can be used for
applications requiring a high level of security. Examples of such applications
are officially recognised identity proofs and digital signatures (e.g., SIM cards
with FINEID functionality). Existing mobile identity solutions, an overview of
which is given in Sect. 2.1.3, show that storing officially recognised credentials
on the SIM is accepted both by the authorities and users. In addition to the
SIM, many hand-held devices include, or will include soon, secure execution
environments and embedded smart cards, which can also be used for storing
keys and identity-related information.
One of the most important benefits of hand-held devices is that they incorpo-
rate both the secure element and a terminal for accessing it. When it comes to
transactions operating on identity or payment-related data, users are more likely
to trust their own mobile phones rather than a PIN-entry device of an uncommon
type in a new place. Indeed, newer attacks on chip-and-pin cards are essentially
MITM attacks that are based on tampering with payment terminals (see p. 36).
The same attacks are harder to mount with the user’s own terminal, because
users receive trustworthy information about what exactly is happening in each
transaction. Moreover, improved trust is also supported by better usability: when
the user learns to operate only one interface on her own device, this suffices in
every situation.
4.3.2 Architecture and infrastructure
The architecture of our mobile identity tool (Fig. 7) is based on the data flow
model already described in Sect. 4.1.1. However, now the SIM-based applet
contains not only a private key of the person, but also some identity-related
information. The identity proxy provides an interface between the identity
verifier’s terminal and the SIM of the prover’s mobile phone. The main tasks
of the identity proxy is to check identity verification requests, provide a user
interface, and construct identity proofs in cooperation with the SIM-based applet.
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In particular, it checks the identity verifier’s credentials, shows a description of
requested data, and acquires the user’s consent prior to constructing an identity
proof. Furthermore, because SIM cards do not have their own clock, the identity
proxy is the source of timestamps for identity proofs.
User
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J2ME
2. Request
3. PIN
4. Proof
Java Card 
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Figure 7: Identity proofs: technologies and data flow.
To enable appropriate privacy protection, we demand the use of informed
user’s consent: the person must be notified about what information will be sent
and to whom it is communicated. No identity information is sent unless the
user’s consent is acquired for this.
The architecture that we have developed is specifically suited for proximity
scenarios. Therefore, we have chosen NFC as the communication technology be-
tween the person’s hand-held device and the identity verifier terminal. Although
currently the number of mobile phone models that support NFC is rather small, it
has been predicted that by 2012 already 20% of mobile phones will be equipped
with NFC [4]. Taking into account the recent acceptance of NFC-related standards
by ETSI, and wide support provided by MNOs and financial service providers, such
predictions seem to have a solid ground. For the development of applications
that use NFC, a J2ME API exists [61]; we have used it in our proof-of-concept
implementations.
4.3.3 Flexible identity proofs based on a single identity profile
Publication III presents a pseudonymous mobile identity tool, the core of which
is a long-lived public key certificate issued to a pseudonym in the form of a
cryptographic hash of the user’s digital photo. This hash is written in the “subject
name” field of the certificate; the actual name of the subject is not included
in the certificate. Instead, the rest of the user’s identity information (including
identity attributes and the user’s photo) is stored separately in the applet. All
these data and the private key corresponding to the user’s certificate are stored
on the SIM.
Identity attributes are stored as pairs of the form 〈field id, value〉, where
field id is the attribute type (we use standard X.509 attribute codes [100] for
coding). An identity verification request contains a list of triples
〈field id | operator | [value]〉+,
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where the operator is one of =, <, >, 6=. The last element, namely a comparison
value, is optional. It is skipped in many situations: for instance, a request for
the subject’s name is formed as
〈surname identifier |= | 〉, 〈first name identifier |= | 〉.
In the case where the operator is other than =, a value must be specified.
Operators < and > are used for checking whether a particular attribute value
belongs to a certain interval: for example, to check whether a person is over 20
years old, a triple
〈date of birth identifier |< | 4.12.1988〉
must be sent, if the transaction takes place on 3.12.2008. Use cases for the
operator 6= are harder to find, but one possible scenario is proving that one is a
resident alien in the country.
Figure 8: An identity proof: main idea.
Identity verification requests must be timestamped and signed with the
verifier’s private key. The identity proxy verifies the signature and checks the
freshness of requests before providing any answers to them. A request is submit-
ted to the SIM-based applet tuple by tuple.
The main body of an identity proof is again a list of triples
〈field id |operator |value〉+.
The list is appended with a timestamp and signed with the user’s private key. In
addition, the user’s certificate and photo are sent to the verifier. Having received
the identity proof, the verifier will first validate the certificate and verify the
signature of the proof. Then, he will calculate a hash of the photo, and check
whether it matches the subject name in the certificate. The photo will be shown
on the verifier’s screen. If the person looks the same as in the photo, and if values
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Figure 9: A proof-of-concept implementation of an identity proof scenario.
From left to right: request composed by the identity verifier; request
shown to the user; response received by the identity verifier.
of the attributes indeed satisfy the requirements set in the request, the verifier
and the prover will proceed with their business. This scenario is depicted in
Fig. 8, and an example using our proof-of-concept tool is given in Fig. 9.
The tool can provide flexible proofs of identity attributes. However, in other
respects, the tool is not general and flexible enough. The biggest limitation is
that only one identity profile is supported, and it cannot be updated after the
SIM card containing it is issued to the user. This also can be bothersome from the
point of view of unlinkability: the same pseudonym is used in all proofs, namely
the hash of the user’s photo. In addition, it is unclear how to combine mobile
payments with this model.
4.3.4 An open mobile identity tool
In study V, we show how to overcome the limitations of our pseudonymous
mobile identity tool. A way to load multiple identity profiles into the open mobile
identity tool is provided, and the set of its applications extended.
In this new architecture, pseudonyms play a crucial role. Sometimes the same
biometric (e.g., a photo) or a pseudonym of the person can be used in different
contexts, and thus in different identity profiles. Therefore, identity profiles
are issued to pseudonyms stored in an open pseudonym pool. The semantic
meanings of pseudonyms in the pool could be “User’s photo” or “Customer
ID of ShopChain Ltd.”, for example. Their content could thus be a biometric
template, a number sequence (representing a customer number, for example),
or a string (representing a customer name, for example). Similarly to the tool
described in III, identity profiles are issued to cryptographic hashes of pseudonym
values. This means that biometric templates are not by default communicated to
identity verifiers. Naturally, the person uses different pseudonyms in different
circumstances.
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An identity profile is based on a private key generated on-card. The cor-
responding public key is signed by the identity issuer (who in this situation
is playing the role of a CA), in a public key certificate issued to a pseudonym.
Identity-related information, in the form of identity attributes, is stored sepa-
rately from the certificate. Typical attributes in many “official” include Date of
birth, Social security number or Type of residence permit, whereas in self-created
profiles these may be PGP key, Personal web page address or Mobile phone number.
Attribute certificates (AC, as per RFC 3281 [42]) associate attributes with the pub-
lic key of the person. The values of attributes in the ACs are masked: certificates
contain only hashes of the form H(A,M), where H(·) is a cryptographic hash
function, A is an attribute value and M is its randomly generated mask. ACs are
signed by the identity issuer. Attribute values and masks are stored separately
from the AC, in the same identity profile. An identity verifier can verify an at-
tribute value only if it has received the value together with the corresponding
mask (in addition to the AC).
In addition to the private-public key pair, an identity profile can also contain
secret keys for symmetric encryption. This facilitates using the mobile phone as
a secure authentication token for online banking, and as an electronic turnkey.
The mobile identity tool is issued to the person on a SIM card by her MNO.
The identity applet on the card is initially empty: it contains no identity profiles
except, maybe, a profile supplied by the MNO. However, the applet includes a
private key and a corresponding public-key certificate called a profile-loading
certificate. The subject name in this certificate is the same as the card number.
The certificate is used later on for authenticating the card prior to loading any
identity profiles to it.
The user must also install the identity proxy application on the phone. Alter-
natively, the application may be pushed over-the-air by the MNO.
Loading identity profiles
The identity tool can be updated with new identity profiles. The user can load
new profiles at any identity issuer. Examples of potential identity issuers include
shop chains (issuing loyalty profiles), banks (issuing profiles with credentials for
payments), or authorities (who can issue official licenses or profiles that replace
standard identity documents). The openness of the tool also enables the user
himself to create and load new profiles, for example business cards.
In order to load a profile into the identity tool, a protocol consisting of three
phases is followed. First, the SIM-based applet and the identity proxy, acting
together, create a certificate signing request (CSR). Second, the identity issuer
constructs the profile. Finally, the new profile is loaded on the card.
The process is started by the identity proxy that generates a fresh timestamp
and submits it to the SIM-based applet. A new key pair is generated on card.
The public key and the timestamp are concatenated, signed using the SIM card-
specific profile-loading private key and sent to the identity proxy. If there is a
suitable pseudonym in the pseudonym pool that can be re-used, the identity
proxy retrieves it from the card. Otherwise, it either asks the user to enter a new
pseudonym, or leaves the creation of it to the identity issuer. The pseudonym is
placed in the subject name field of the CSR. The signature of the newly created
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public key is written in the set of attributes in the CSR [89]. The identity proxy
constructs the CertificationRequestInfo block of the CSR and acquires a signature
for it from the card (the newly created profile-specific private key is used for
signing). Finally, the CSR is submitted to the identity vendor, together with the
profile-loading certificate.
Having received the CSR, the identity issuer verifies its signatures and checks
the profile-loading certificate. Whenever needed, a normal user authentication
procedure with regard to the presented pseudonym is performed. Namely, the
user has to prove her connection to that pseudonym by either performing a
biometric authentication or presenting a public key certificate issued to that
pseudonym and proving the possession of the corresponding private key. Al-
ternatively, the identity vendor can provide a new pseudonym or accept the
one suggested by the user. The identity vendor finally creates a new public
key certificate and submits it to the identity proxy along with information and
certificates related to identity attributes. In addition, the identity vendor can
supply a number of secret keys (for symmetric encryption/decryption) encrypted
using the user’s public key. If a new pseudonym is created, its description is
attached to it. The pseudonym will be stored in the pseudonym pool.
The identity proxy loads the new profile on the card, which stores the certifi-
cates and identity attribute information without performing any checks on them.
If a new pseudonym is supplied, it is stored in the pseudonym pool. Secret keys
are also decrypted and stored in the profile.
Using identity profiles
An open mobile identity tool implemented on the mobile phone can be used in
the following scenarios:
• Identity checks. The check is performed with regard to a certain identity
profile and a certain pseudonym. The user is notified about what infor-
mation is requested and by whom, and can either comply with or reject
the identity check request. Only the minimally required set of identity
attributes is opened to the verifier. Furthermore, certain profiles can be
PIN-protected: the user has to enter her PIN code before the SIM card applet
will provide an identity proof.
• Digital signatures. In addition to an identity check, the verifier can request
a digital signature from the person. The text of the signed document is
shown on the mobile phone screen. For digital signatures, a longer (e.g.,
6-digit) PIN code could be used, whereas for standard identity proofs a
standard 4-digit PIN is sufficient, if required at all.
• Challenge responses. A service provider can request encryption of a chal-
lenge with a secret key included in a profile. With NFC communication,
electronic keys and other access tokens are standard use cases for this
scenario.
• One-time passwords. This scenario is similar to the previous one; the only
difference is that the current time is used as a challenge. The mobile phone
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can therefore be used as a secure authentication token which shows a new
one-time password every minute or half a minute.
Biometric authentication of the user can be easily performed, following the
same method as in our single-profile identity tool. If a biometric identifier is
used as a pseudonym, the corresponding biometric pattern becomes available
to the identity verifier, and can be used in normal biometric authentication. For
example, if facial biometrics is used, the person’s photo can be shown on a screen
to the identity verifier representative, who can then compare it with the person’s
face.
4.3.5 Security evaluation
Security and privacy requirements for a mobile identity tool are listed in Sect.
2.1.2. Most importantly, it should be impossible for an attacker to impersonate
the rightful owner of the mobile identity tool. Moreover, the rightful owner of
the tool should not be able to change the identity information stored in the
tool—unless a self-issued identity profile is in question. Reading user’s identity
information should be prevented, unless the user’s consent for this is given.
Although the systems presented in publications III and V use the same data
flow model, their security models are somewhat different. In our single-profile
system, the integrity and authenticity of attribute values are only protected by the
tamper resistance of the SIM card. The SIM-based applet does not have a way of
checking whether the attribute values have been tampered with. Identity verifiers,
in turn, have to trust statements provided by the applet, and have no other way
of ensuring the authenticity of attribute values. The main security assumption
here is that the attacker cannot bypass the tamper resistance protection of the
SIM card to change identity attribute values.
We argue that the situation concerning tamper resistance is not different
from that of normal electronic identity cards. Indeed, if an attacker finds a way
to tamper with the card to make controlled changes in attribute values, she can
use the same way to access and alter the private key. This is normally assumed to
be unacceptable by the security model of the PKI systems. The level of protection
provided by modern smart cards against such attacks is sufficient for identity
documents: many countries issue smart card based e-IDs. Therefore, it is prudent
to assume that this level of protection is sufficient for our case as well.
It must be noted that the consequences of the private key leakage here are
not the same as in the case of normal electronic identity cards. Indeed, if a
private key is leaked from the SIM, the attacker can forge values of any identity
attributes. A private key leaked from a normal electronic identity card, on the
other hand, can only be used for impersonating its rightful user, or producing
digital signatures on behalf of the user. The user of a mobile identity tool can
therefore be expected to have an increased motivation to break the tamper
resistance protection of the SIM card.
In study V, however, we used more traditional security assumptions. The
protection of identity attributes does not rely only on the tamper resistance of
the SIM card: it is achieved by using attribute certificates digitally signed by the
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identity issuer. This ensures the integrity and authenticity of identity attributes.
The security assumptions here are as follows:
• The attacker cannot read or modify any cryptographic keys stored on the
SIM card by bypassing its tamper resistance protection.
• The attacker cannot forge the identity issuer’s digital signature for a modi-
fied attribute certificate.
• The attacker cannot mount a second pre-image attack on the cryptographic
hash function used for masking attribute values.
The difference between this and the previously described model is that identity
verifiers do not have to blindly trust statements about identity attributes issued
by the SIM.
A security assumption common to both models is that the attacker cannot
install malware on the mobile phone that can exchange messages with the SIM
card. Note that protection against such attacks is provided by the implementation
of SATSA-APDU: in order to communicate with the SIM, a J2ME applet must be
digitally signed with a private key corresponding to a public key, a hash of
which is stored on the SIM. Breaking this security assumption does not enable
impersonation attacks, but can enable reading the user’s identity information
without her consent.
Attention must be paid to the way of showing messages on the screen of the
mobile phone, and the formatting of the messages. A message that is shown
on the mobile phone screen might look different from its printed version or its
representation on the screens of other devices. The differences might lead to the
what you see is what you sign (WYSIWYS) problem [71], which must be properly
addressed.
An authentication token implemented using a mobile phone has certain
benefits over usual security tokens. In particular, it is easier to provide time
synchronisation with the service provider, because both the identity proxy and the
service provider’s authentication server can easily synchronise their clocks with
the MNO. In many subscriptions this feature is enabled by default. Using mobile
phones removes the need for separate hardware tokens, reducing expenditures
on devices and logistical costs.
Minimisation of data collection is fully implemented, as well as other security
and privacy-related features. Table 2 provides a comparison of our mobile identity
tool with common eID tokens. In our view, the most important features of our
open mobile identity tool is its privacy by minimisation of data exposure and
informed user consent.
Clearly, anonymous credentials systems (such as [14] or [19]) can achieve
better data minimisation. However, for most daily scenarios they tend to be an
overkill. Indeed, most loyalty, payment, or license scenarios are pseudonymous
rather than anonymous: the user is issued with a pseudonym for a given system,
and this pseudonym is later used for associating the user with their account.
Privacy issues can also be reasonably taken into account in the design of such
systems [29]. Without any doubt, there are cases where anonymous credentials
are the best alternative (e.g., [16]); however these are more common in wide
area networking rather than in proximity scenarios.
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Table 2: Security features of our mobile identity tool, compared with other
e-IDs.
Security and privacy features eID cards Biometric
passports
M-COMM Our
proposal
Minimization of data collection – – – Yes
User consent Yes1 – Yes1 Yes
Authentication and integrity Yes – Yes Yes
Confidentiality Yes2 – Yes3 Yes
Easiness of revocation Yes4 Yes4 Yes Yes
1 Only request for all identity information can be accepted or rejected.
2 Information can be read from stolen cards.
3 Mobile network operator can always read all information.
4 Not for offline transactions.
4.4 Combining biometric authentication and
privacy-enhancing technologies
When identity documents are read by electronic means, a lot of information is
not only revealed, but can be copied, stored and processed without our consent.
With biometric patterns revealed to identity verifiers, this becomes a serious
privacy problem. Usual paper- or plastic-based documents do not have this
problem: the photo of the document holder is simply shown to the verifier, and
is not stored anywhere electronically. We argue that similar privacy-preserving
biometric authentication (where a facial photo is used as the least intrusive and
the most common and widely accepted biometrics) can be performed with the
mobile phone used as an eID token. Indeed, as mobile phones have screens with
resolution sufficient for showing a face photograph, the only problem is ensuring
the trusted path between the store place of the certified photo and the screen.
Publication IV describes how this can be achieved.
4.4.1 Biometric authentication and unlinkability
The problem of combining privacy-enhancing technologies with biometric au-
thentication is essentially in the provision of unlinkability. Indeed, if a biometric
pattern of a person becomes available to identity verifiers, they can easily collude
and trace this person by linking transactions with the same pattern. Clearly, this
is not the only problem that arises due to such wide electronic “broadcasting”
of biometrics. The patterns can be stored in various systems, and this can lead
to invasive secondary market effects, function creep, the loss of autonomy, and
other “Big Brother”-like scenarios (see [117, Chapter 12] for a discussion of how
biometrics impacts privacy).
The question is, however, whether it is really necessary to give biometric
patterns into the possession of identity verifiers. If the user’s device is trusted, it
can perform biometric authentication on its own, and inform the identity verifier
only about the result of authentication. For example, the AXS-authentication
system [9] does just that: a trusted device checks the user’s fingerprint, and
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calculates a challenge response (to be used for online authentication) if the
match is successful. As is shown in publication IV, similar privacy-preserving
biometric authentication is possible also in face-to-face identity checks with
mobile phones. If biometric patterns are not released to verifiers, unlinkability of
transactions can be easier to achieve, and patterns cannot be reused by verifiers
later on.
In fact, only a small modification in our open mobile identity scheme is
needed. As described in Sect. 4.3.4, the person’s photo is just another pseudonym
stored in the pseudonym pool. Remember also that identity profiles are issued to
cryptographic hashes of biometric patterns. From the identity proof, the identity
verifier can check the integrity and authenticity of the hash of the photo, but
does not receive the photo itself in a digital form.
Now assume that both the identity verifier and the identity proxy compute a
cryptographic hash of all messages exchanged between them during the identity
proof protocol. We call this hash (perhaps trimmed to only a few hexadecimal
digits) an identity proof fingerprint. The identity proxy can then superimpose the
fingerprint on the user’s photo and show the result on the screen of the mobile
phone. The identity verifier can compare the fingerprints and check whether
the photo matches the user standing in front of him. In this way we can ensure
that the photo comes from the identity proxy, and not from a malicious program
running on the same mobile phone. This scenario is depicted in Fig. 10.
Our scheme solves one particular problem: biometric patterns are no longer
communicated to identity verifiers. However, other problems remain unsolved: it
is still possible to link transactions using the hash of the photo. Although it would
be possible to use other PETs to provide unlinkability on the protocol level (for
example, using the scheme presented by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [19]), it is
hard to provide unlinkability on the transport level. Although in many wireless
networks link-layer and network-layer identifiers can be randomized [11, 48, 63,
85], for NFC the situation is different. The reason is that NFC phones can be used
in the NFC token emulation mode, where tokens have unique identifiers (serial
numbers). Should it be possible to disable the broadcasting of this identifier, our
scheme could be updated by building in a privacy-enhancing technology which
provides unlinkability.
4.4.2 Trusted user interface
In our scenario the screen of a hand-held device is trusted by the identity verifier
to show the right photo. But is it trustworthy? Since mobile phones are built
on relatively open platforms, we must also consider potential attacks on this
scheme.
If the attacker quickly switches from the identity proxy to another applica-
tion to show the attacker’s photo instead of the proper one, he can potentially
impersonate the user. This attack is prevented by the identity proof fingerprint:
the attacker also has to show the correct fingerprint on the forged photo. The
security architecture of J2ME uses the sandbox model, preventing applications
from accessing the memory space of other applications; therefore, the attacker’s
program cannot intercept data sent by the identity proxy. The fingerprint calcu-
lation includes two digital signatures made with the private keys unknown to
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Figure 10: An identity proof with biometric authentication.
the attacker; this essentially cuts the chances of guessing the fingerprint to 1 in
1048576, if five hexadecimal digits are used in the fingerprint.
Malware with screen capture capabilities could potentially be used to make a
screenshot of the identity proxy terminal at the time when it displays the user’s
photo, extract the identity proof fingerprint and place it on another photo, to
impersonate the legitimate user. A “fraudulent” user may wait for a second or two
before showing the phone to a verifier without the latter becoming suspicious.
To prevent these “screenshot attacks”, the following techniques can be used:
• Visual distortion of the identity proof fingerprint (using CAPTCHA-like tech-
niques [112], for example).
• Placing the fingerprint in several random locations.
• Slight randomised distortion of the user’s photo (using Stirmark [93],
for example). This is useful for preventing the attacker from analysing
a captured watermarked image against a non-watermarked one, for ex-
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tracting the identity proof fingerprint. The non-watermarked image could
be obtained by the attacker by using collusion attacks on a number of
watermarked images.
With the development of mobile trusted modules it might become easier
to build a trustworthy user interface on mobile phones. For example, it might
become possible for an application to get an exclusive access to the screen for a
fixed period of time. Using such functionality, the identity proxy can request such
exclusive access for a few seconds, preventing malicious users and malicious
applications from meddling with the screen.
The openness of the mobile phone platform opens a way for yet another
attack (Tuomas Aura is acknowledged for the idea). This is a relay attack, in
which the attacker gives the real phone and the SIM to a friend and uses a
modified phone himself. The modified phone has a software that emulates the
identity proxy to the identity verifier’s terminal. The authentication messages
are relayed using this software from the modified phone to the real phone. Any
wireless connection (except NFC) can be used for this. Eventually, the real phone
shows the authentic photo and the 5-digit code on its screen. The attacker’s
friend reads the code and types it into another computer that relays it to the
modified phone. The modified phone presents a wrong photo and the correct
5-digit code. In an optimized version, the friend could be replaced with a digital
camera and optical character recognition (OCR) software that read the code from
the screen of the real phone.
The attack can be used for impersonating the owners of lost phones, or
by users who wish to “lend” their identity for any reasons. Because the data
exchange between the real and the modified phone introduces delays, the attack
can be detected with distance-bounding mechanisms. However, to fully prevent
the attack, the presence of the original SIM card at the scene must be ensured.
This would require direct message exchange between the terminal and the SIM
prior and after the biometric authentication. Although this is technically possible
[40, 41], the usability of the scheme will decrease. We leave the development of
countermeasures against this relay attack for future work.
System software vulnerabilities also pose a threat to our scheme. For example,
if the standard SATSA-APDU protection is overridden, malware can be used for
accessing the SIM card and showing any photo together with the correct identity
proof fingerprint. The security of the model can be improved if the identity
proxy is run within a secure execution environment, and if its integrity can be
measured by the identity verifier prior to performing an identity proof. Such
functionality can later appear with the further development of mobile trusted
modules. It would also solve the relay attack problem.
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5
Conclusions
5.1 Contributions of the thesis
The main contribution of this thesis is the technology for transforming a mobile
phone with a trusted tamper-resistant security element in a form of a PKI-SIM
card into a flexible mobile identity management tool. The tool supports mul-
tiple identity profiles that can be used for strong mobile user authentication
both in remote and face-to-face scenarios. As a result, the scheme combines
ubiquitousness with user convenience and acceptance.
The distinctive features of our scheme are non-repudiation and full confiden-
tiality of transaction-related information, which allows it to be used for macro
payments and for mobile banking. As a demonstration of a use case, it was
shown how such authentication with a mobile phone can be used in mobile
payment systems.
Privacy issues are of the utmost importance in our solution, where we use
the principles of informed user consent and data minimisation. Furthermore,
privacy-aware biometric authentication of persons is supported.
The relationship between the research hypotheses (see Sect. 3.2) and publi-
cations constituting this thesis are given in Table 3. We consider that published
results provide enough evidence to the truthfulness of the hypotheses. Additional
testing must be performed in field studies, which is acknowledged in Sect. 5.2.
In study I, a technology for strong authentication of mobile users was de-
signed. The technology employs the Finnish national electronic identity system.
The user’s public key is stored on the SIM and is accessed by a J2ME applet called
an identity proxy through the SATSA API. This data flow model is used later in
publications II–IV. Furthermore, the study presents a sketch of a mobile payment
system for vending machines.
Publication II presents a mobile payment system in which users are au-
thenticated by the technology developed in study I. Two payment protocols
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Table 3: Relationship between research hypotheses and publications.
Research hypothesis and claim Publications
1 (a) Strong authentication of mobile users can be performed by
employing a national electronic identity system and corre-
sponding infrastructure.
I
(b) The authentication of mobile users can be done without using
the authentication services of mobile network operators.
I
(c) Systems that rely on such authentication can be fully open
and easy to join by any customer, mobile network operator,
service provider, and financial institution.
I, II, V
2 (a) A national electronic identity system can be used for building
a general user and citizen identification and authentication
system for access control.
III
(b) Such a mobile identity can be securely used in many applica-
tions instead of usual identification cards or passports.
III, IV
(c) Privacy in systems that use such a mobile identity can be
higher than in systems that use usual identification cards and
passports.
III, IV
3 (a) A mobile phone with a security element such as the SIM card
is a suitable device for becoming a ubiquitous mobile identity
management tool.
V
(b) The tool can facilitate flexible identity proofs using chosen
identity profiles.
V
(c) Such tool can be open to use by any identity providers and
identity verifiers.
V
are constructed: one for virtual POS payments, and one for real POS payments.
A proof-of-concept implementation of a system for purchasing train tickets is
presented, with a detailed description of the technologies involved in the imple-
mentation. In addition, the security of the mobile payment system is analysed in
the scope of existing solutions.
In publication III, problems of currently prevalent electronic IDs are reviewed,
and a pseudonymous mobile identity tool is designed. The goal was to fix prob-
lems with privacy, using the principles of data minimisation and informed user
consent. The tool runs on a mobile phone and can be used in many scenarios
instead of biometric passports or electronic identity cards. Biometric authentica-
tion based on the person’s photo as the least intrusive biometric is supported.
User’s identity information is securely stored on the SIM by the identity issuer,
and is accessed through the identity proxy applet. An implementation of the
model was prepared.
When biometric authentication is done, biometric patterns are often revealed
to identity verifiers. This raises a number of privacy concerns. In paper IV,
a privacy-aware way of performing biometric authentication using hand-held
devices is presented. The person’s photo is shown to the identity verifier on
the screen of the hand-held device, while the actual identity proof is delivered
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using NFC or other short-range communication technology. The authenticity
of the photo is protected using a proof fingerprint calculated by applying a
cryptographic hash function to the data exchanged by the parties.
Paper V extends the mobile identity tool by adding support for multiple
identity profiles. The profiles can be added in the post-issuance phase of the tool
life cycle. Openness was the main principle applied in this work: identity profiles
can be loaded or checked by any identity issuers or verifiers, if the user’s consent
is granted for this.
The proposed schemes rely on current handset technology and off-the-shelf
development tools. Proof-of-concept implementations have been prepared to
demonstrate this.
5.2 Limitations of the study
The studies presented in this thesis are not free from limitations. The potentiality
of implementing the described solutions into use is limited by several factors.
Although we have used existing hand-held device technology in all experiments,
some of this technology, especially SATSA and NFC, are still only emerging. Never-
theless, given the speed of mobile technology progress, the situation may change
rapidly.
Another limitation is the lack of infrastructure (mainly terminals) required for
implementing our solutions into use. On the other hand, several big corporations
have shown clear interest in the development of a short-range communication
technology and applications that use it. With the further development of con-
tactless payments using credit cards and similar tokens, the number of terminals
can be expected to grow quickly. A similar change was seen recently with the
introduction of chip-and-pin payments. Terminals for contactless payments are
likely to be introduced in due time. They can be also used for identity proofs
and, perhaps, other applications.
Given the limitations described above, we were not able to run any in-field
experiments. We also have not yet considered standardisation of the presented so-
lutions. This has to be done in cooperation with MNOs, governmental authorities
and banks.
5.3 Future work
Future work on this research topic may concentrate on the following directions.
Combining national PKI with mobile technology enables macro payments and
mobile financial services such as mobile banking. However, close cooperation
with governmental bodies, banks, and MNOs has to be established for continuing
this work. Pilot projects must be run, and standardisation issues elaborated.
Identity federations-related standards could work as a starting point in this
research. The new “connected” version of Java Card 3.0 could provide further
possibilities for the development of user-centric identity management on hand-
held devices with security elements.
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The mobile identity tool could be made even more flexible by combining it
with solutions that store and process credentials in secure execution environ-
ments of hand-held devices (e.g., Nokia’s ObC). Trusted mobile platforms have
to be further developed to provide reliable and trustworthy user interfaces. In
particular, trusted applications must be able to get exclusive access to the user
interface of the device for a period of time.
Our privacy-aware biometric authentication idea has raised interesting re-
quirements concerning watermarking technologies. This suggests a new potential
research avenue: the development of “CAPTCHA-watermarks” for images. While
most research in watermarking has focused on invisible watermarks, this water-
mark should be visible. In addition, it does not need to be fragile or robust, and
it may be easily removable, but the analysis of its contents should be difficult
for computers. At the same time, verification of “CAPTCHA-watermarks” by hu-
mans has to be easy. The requirements substantially differ from those in normal
watermarking applications, which calls for more research in watermarking.
Yet another research direction is a critical examination of the susceptibility of
currently available electronic identity cards to viral attacks. As was mentioned
on p. 25, malicious software could potentially gain access to such cards and
use them without the user’s consent. However, such possibilities have not been
analysed closely enough, so further research on the topic is needed.
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